






CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN UK 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
TURUN YLIOPISTON JULKAISUJA –  ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS TURKUENSIS
Sarja - ser. E osa  - tom. 25 | Oeconomica | Turku 2018
ISBN 978-951-29-7090-2 (PRINT)
ISBN 978-951-29-7091-9 (PDF)


















TURUN YLIOPISTON JULKAISUJA – ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS TURKUENSIS
Sarja - ser. E osa - tom. 25 | Oeconomica | Turku 2018
Peter Agyemang-Mintah
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 













Professor Collins G. Ntim




Assistant Professor Jonas Spohr
Faculty of Social Sciences, Business and Economics
Åbo Akademi University
Finland
The originality of this thesis has been checked in accordance with the University of Turku quality 
assurance system using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.




Painosalama Oy - Turku, Finland 2018
University of Turku 
Turku School of Economics
Department of Accounting and Finance
Opponent
Professor Collins G. Ntim

























“Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore, get      
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This thesis consists of four published empirical studies on the effect of three board 
monitoring committees (namely: audit, remuneration and nomination committees) 
and board diversity on the performance of UK financial institutions.  
The collapse of large financial institutions and non-financial firms, coupled with 
the global financial crisis in 2007/08, precipitated a number of corporate govern-
ance reforms in the UK. Compellingly, the continuous corporate governance re-
forms all recommended the formation and appointment of key board monitoring 
committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination, together with board di-
versity to help improve firms’ effectiveness. 
This research uniquely examined the effect of these three committees and board 
gender diversity on the performance of UK financial institutions during the 
pre/post global financial crisis era. 
The empirical results first indicate that the presence of the three board monitoring 
committees and board gender diversity have a positive and statistically significant 
link with the financial performance of the sampled UK financial institutions. Sub-
sequent tests conducted during the pre- and post-2007/08 financial crisis periods 
show mixed results. Specifically, the pre-crisis results show that the establishment 
of these monitoring board committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) and 
board gender diversity remained positive and statistically significant before the 
07/08 financial crisis. However, the post-crisis period results were not statistically 
significant, indicating that the 07/08 financial crisis appeared to have affected the 
financial performance of the financial institutions examined.  
Overall, the thesis provides practical implications for governments, policy-
makers and regulatory authorities by indicating the importance of monitoring 
committees and board gender diversity for corporate success. 
The findings are consistent with agency, stakeholder and resource dependence 
theories and group effectiveness theories. This suggests that board committees 
and board gender diversity enhance board monitoring, bring a diversity of ideas 
and ultimately improve firm performance. 
Keywords: audit, remuneration, nomination, gender diversity, board committee, 
firm financial performance, UK, pre- and post-2007/08 financial crisis. 
Paper type: Empirical research
 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tämä väitöskirja sisältää neljä aiemmin julkaistua empiiristä tutkimusta, joissa tar-
kastellaan hallituksen valvontakomiteoiden (tilintarkastus-, palkkaus- ja nimitys-
valiokunnan) sekä hallituksen sukupuolijakauman vaikutuksia rahoituslaitosten 
suoriutumiseen Yhdistyneessä kuningaskunnassa.  
Suurten rahoituslaitosten ja yritysten romahdus sekä maailmanlaajuinen finanssi-
kriisi vuosina 2007/08 sai aikaan suuria muutoksia yritysten hallinnointijärjestel-
mään Yhdistyneessä kuningaskunnassa. Uudistusten yleinen suositus oli juuri hal-
lituksen valvontakomiteoiden perustaminen sekä hallituksen sukupuolten moni-
naisuuden huomiointi, kun tavoitteena on yrityksen tehokkuuden parantaminen.  
Tässä väitöskirjassa tarkasteltiin ensimmäistä kertaa kolmen edellä mainitun ko-
mitean ja hallituksen monimuotoisuuden vaikutuksia Yhdistyneen kuningaskun-
nan rahoituslaitosten suoriutumiseen ennen maailmanlaajuista finanssikriisiä ja 
sen jälkeen. 
Empiiriset tulokset osoittivat, että hallituksen valvontakomiteoiden olemassaololla ja 
niiden sukupuolten välisellä moninaisuudella oli positiivinen ja tilastollisesti merkit-
tävä vaikutus otokseen valittujen rahoituslaitoksien taloudelliseen suoriutumisky-
kyyn. Kuitenkin erilliset testit, jotka suoritettiin aineistolla ennen ja jälkeen 2007/08 
finanssikriisin, antoivat myös eriäviä tuloksia. Erityisesti kriisiä edeltävät tulokset 
osoittivat, että valvontakomiteoiden (tilintarkastus-, palkkaus- ja nimityskomitea) pe-
rustaminen ja hallituksen sukupuolten välinen moninaisuus pysyivät positiivisina ja 
tilastollisesti merkittävinä ennen rahoituskriisiä 07/08. Kriisin jälkeiset tulokset eivät 
kuitenkaan olleet tilastollisesti merkitseviä, mikä viittasi siihen, että rahoituskriisi 
07/08 oli vaikuttanut tarkasteltujen rahoituslaitosten taloudelliseen suorituskykyyn.  
Tämä tutkimus tarjoaa hyödyllistä tietoa hallituksille, poliittisille päätöksenteki-
jöille ja sääntelyviranomaisille osoittamalla seurantakomiteoiden ja sukupuolten 
välisen moninaisuuden tärkeyden yritysten menestykselle. 
Tulokset ovat yhdenmukaisia agentti-, sidosryhmä-, resurssiriippuvuusteorian 
sekä ryhmän tehokkuusteorioiden kanssa. Tämä viittaa siihen, että valvontakomi-
teat ja eri sukupuolten esiintyminen hallituksessa edistävät hallituksen valvonta-
mahdollisuuksia sekä synnyttävät erilaisia ideoita, jotka lopulta johtavat yrityksen 
suorituskyvyn paranemiseen. 
Avainsanat: tilintarkastus, palkkaus, nimitys, sukupuolten välinen monimuotoi-
suus, hallintokomitea, yrityksen taloudellinen suoriutuminen, Yhdistynyt kunin-
gaskunta, finanssikriisi 2007/08. 
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1.1 Background and Characterisation of the Research Environment 
The Cadbury Report, which sets the foundation for corporate governance ‘best 
practice’ in the UK and other countries in the world, defines corporate governance 
as a “system by which companies are directed and controlled” (1992, s.2.5; FRC, 
2016). This suggests that the process whereby firms are governed and monitored 
is of great importance to all key players. For example, governance in the financial 
sectors goes beyond shareholders (equity governance) to include employees, di-
rectors, creditors, debtors and the government. This indicates that all stakeholders 
are deeply involved in the management of financial institutions. Again, the internal 
corporate governance in financial institutions focuses on shareholders and the 
board of directors, whilst the external corporate governance concentrates on mar-
kets for corporate control such as external auditors, rating agencies, government 
supervision and regulation (Levine, 2011; Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012; Hopt, 
2013; Ntim 2013). This is quite different from non-financial firms’ corporate gov-
ernance regulation where external corporate control is not very necessary.  
However, the unexpected collapse of large financial institutions in the UK such as 
BCCI bank, Barings Bank, Equitable Life Assurance Society and other non-finan-
cial firms, coupled with the global financial crisis in 2007/08, which also affected 
banks such as Northern Rock, RBS, Lloyds TSB, Dunfermline Building Society, 
etc., shook the entire UK financial sector and affected the economy1. The occur-
rence of these corporate collapses called for major reforms in corporate govern-
ance policies in the UK. More precisely, from the 1990s onwards, different corpo-
rate governance codes emerged as a result of the reforms to guide firms. Examples 
of these reforms include the Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), 
Hampel Report (1998), Combined Code (2003 and 2006), Walker Review (2009) 
and FRC (2012, 2014 and 2016), all of which recommended the formation and 
appointment of key board monitoring committees such as audit, remuneration and 
nomination as well as board diversity.  
Obviously, before financial institutions in the UK can be robust and resilient to 
corporate failures, there is the need for the board of directors to comply with the 
corporate governance reforms. They also need to form monitoring committees and 
ensure there is gender diversity.  
                                                 
1 The frequent corporate governance reforms in the UK have been necessitated due to the complex nature 
of the financial institutions’ products and services. The sector is also very complex to manage, as it requires 




More importantly, the reforms will see board committee members addressing any 
corporate governance overlaps, so as to tackle unforeseen events. This will even-
tually improve the capacity of corporate boards to effectively advise, monitor and 
discipline corporate executives (West, 2006, 2009; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jen-
sen, 1993, Ntim, 2013).  
The role of the directors working on the board monitoring committees is classified 
into two critical functions of monitoring or oversight and advising or supporting the 
executive management on important decisions concerning the company (Baldenius 
et al. 2014; Leung et al. 2014). The advising/supporting board committees tend to 
focus on marketing, production, finance, environment and information technology 
issues. The monitoring committees deal with audit, nomination and remuneration 
issues, which are intended to protect shareholder interests by advising the board and 
holding them accountable for their actions. In addition, the monitoring committees 
offer some advantages, such as having relatively small board sizes. They are also 
able to meet more frequently and provide sufficient time for meaningful dialogue in 
order to reach consensus much quicker (Vefeas, 1999a, 1999b; Karamanou and Ve-
feas, 2005; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Ntim, 2013). The advising and mon-
itoring committees help in bringing individual directors’ specialist knowledge and 
expertise to the board decision-making process and allow the main board to focus 
on other areas of interest to the firm (Harrison, 1987; Klein, 1998; Carcello et al. 
2002; Sun and Cahan, 2009; Ntim, 2013)2. Empirically, having monitoring commit-
tees can improve firm financial performance by reducing self-dealing activities by 
opportunistic managers through effective monitoring (Harrison, 1987).  
Functionally, for example, the establishment of an audit committee is so important 
that it requires that at least one member of the committee should have recent and 
relevant financial experience. Furthermore, the committee’s duties should also fol-
low relevant UK professional and regulatory requirements (FRC, 2014 and 2016). 
The audit committee is responsible for monitoring the integrity of the firm’s finan-
cial statements; reviewing the firm’s internal financial controls and risk manage-
ment systems; reviewing and monitoring the external auditor’s independence and 
objectivity; and implementing policy on the engagement of the external auditors 
concerning the supplying of non-audit services, taking into consideration relevant 
ethical guidance regarding the provision of non-audit services by the external audit 
firm (Cadbury Report, 1992; Smith Review, 2003; FRC, 2014 and 2016).  
The remuneration committee is responsible for ensuring that the interests of the 
agents and shareholders are aligned to the long-term success of the firm relating to 
salary, bonus, share options, performance-related pay scheme, pension scheme and 
commissions (Cadbury Report, 1992; FRC, 2014 and 2016). Finally, the nomina-
tion committee is responsible for making appointments and recommendations to 
the board on the evaluations of the balance of skills, experience, independence and 
                                                 
2 The board serves as the link between the people who provide capital (the shareholders) and the people 
who add value to the capital (the managers). The board also becomes the liaison between either the con-
centrated or dispersed shareholders of a company (Monks and Minow, 2004). The board committees also 





knowledge of the board members. The committee is also responsible for preparing 
a description of the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment. The 
committee should include a description of the board’s policy on diversity including 
gender (ibid). 
Even though the formation of the remuneration and nomination committees is im-
portant to the firm’s legislator, the establishment of an audit committee brings 
more legislative and regulatory requirements to the firm and less freedom than the 
remuneration and nomination committees (FRC, 2014 and 2016). This also serves 
as a motivation and gives an incentive to study all these three committees instead 
of focusing solely on the audit committee. 
Further, the UK corporate governance code requires a board to have these three 
committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) since they are considered key 
groups because of their functions relating to organisational success (Cadbury Re-
port, 1992; Combined Code, 2006; FRC, 2014 and 2016). The Walker Review 
(2009) on banks and other financial institutions recommended the creation of a risk 
committee; however, in some firms the functions of the audit committee also cover 
risk management and therefore there will not be a need for an additional commit-
tee. This suggests that, in some firms, the committees could be different and there 
could be more than three of them, but all aim to scrutinise decisions and solve 
organisational problems within the firms. Additionally, every board monitoring 
committee should have terms of reference indicating its functions and responsibil-
ity as to what it will do (Cadbury Report, 1998; Walker Review, 2009; FRC, 2016). 
For the purpose of this research, the emphasis will be on these three committees 
mentioned above, as their establishment can still help solve organisational issues. 
Also, the empirical literature regarding financial institutions’ internal corporate gov-
ernance board committees and their association with firm financial performances is 
still at its emerging phase (Dalton et al. 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Ntim, 2013). 
The limited empirical evidence available makes this research worthwhile as it will 
help shed additional insights on the effects of board committees and the presence of 
women on corporate boards on firm financial performance in the UK. 
Apart from the board monitoring committees, this research will also look at gender 
diversity, specifically female gender on the corporate board of UK financial insti-
tutions. When the nomination committee appoints males and females onto the cor-
porate board with the aim of balancing divergent views and improving the firm’s 
financial performance, we define it as board gender diversity (BGD). Julizaerma 
and Sori (2012) describe women as individuals with the ability to manage any firm 
due to their characteristics, which are believed to be emotional, meticulous and 
particular in any decision-making process. Kramer et al. (2007) indicate that 
women are known to ask tough questions and bring unity into leadership positions. 
Terjesen et al. (2009) also reveal that diversity in boards brings unique human 
capital and helps enhance board independence as diverse groups create different 
opinions and can help improve the quality of decision-making (McLeod and Lobel, 




may serve as a positive signal to prospective job applicants looking to join the 
company.  
Board gender diversity (BGD) has become an issue of discussion because of four 
benefits that a firm tends to gain from the diversity. Namely, BGD improves a 
firm’s financial performance; creates opportunities to attract a wider pool of talent; 
the firm becomes more responsive to the market (Doldor et al. 2012); and, finally, 
board gender diversity enables firms to strengthen their corporate governance pol-
icies (ibid). 
Generally, the debate on board gender diversity is supported by two primary argu-
ments. The first argument holds the view that women with competent skills, experi-
ence and qualifications deserve the opportunity to serve on corporate boards. The 
second argument suggests that positive gender diversity amongst corporate directors 
results in better governance and enhances the performance of a firm. The second 
argument means that the representation of women on the board should serve solely 
to improve performance; otherwise, firms will merely be engaging in ‘tokenism.’  
Also, gender diversity has become an issue to countries as well. For example, the 
European Commission (EC) is considering imposing quotas of female representa-
tives on corporate boards across the EU. Countries such as Norway and Spain have 
legislations where there is a quota for women selected for membership on the cor-
porate boards (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Malaysia has imposed a 30% quota and 
Brazil targets 40% for state-controlled firms (The Economist, 2014). 
The formation of board monitoring committees and the presence of women on the 
corporate board when established can help the board to monitor and advise the 
executive management on important decisions concerning the firm and eventually 
have an impact on the firm’s success. However, the formation and adoption of 
corporate governance codes such as the establishment of board committees and the 
presence of women on UK corporate boards are on a voluntary basis. This means 
that firms can either ‘Comply with the code or Explain’ reasons for non-compli-
ance, as firms are not obliged to either establish these committees or consider fe-
male gender representation as an alternative to board successes (FRC, 2014 and 
2016; Mintah, 2015). For a firm to comply with the UK corporate governance 
code, it means they have adopted corporate governance provisions and roles such 
as audit, nomination, remuneration and gender diversity among others in the board 
functions. The ‘Comply or Explain’ nature of corporate governance in the UK of-
fers an optional or voluntary regulation for firms in terms of adoption of the code, 
unlike the US-style of mandatory regime (‘comply or else’). This makes corporate 
governance in the UK more flexible than in other countries (Akbar et al. 2015)3. 
Regardless of the importance of board committees and gender diversity for UK 
financial institutions, the 2007/08 global financial crisis had a significant effect on 
these firms. The financial crisis started when the mortgage market in the United 
                                                 
3 https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf; https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/default.htm. 




States (US) collapsed (Mizen, 2008). Before then, the mortgage industry experi-
enced a high housing bubble, which was later turned into a burst. This burst led to 
the fall of mortgage prices, and eventually led to the collapse of large financial 
institutions in the US and other parts of the world. The UK economy was greatly 
hit due to diversification of investment and global market trade. Also, financial 
institutions with bad governance structure prior to the crisis engaged in high-risk 
investment and had high returns. Obviously, they made high profit in good times 
but they were hit hard after the financial crisis. Bad governance in the financial 
sector lead to massive risk taking and potentially high returns. The over-riskiness 
(high risk above normal) was then revealed only after the financial crisis when the 
profitability of those firms dropped astronomically. The financial crisis did not 
only affect financial institutions, it also affected non-financial firms. This means 
that institutions are interlinked and depend entirely on each other for survival. 
In order to empirically carry out this research, the thesis will set two main objec-
tives. The first objective attempts to discover if the presence of board committees 
among UK financial institutions influenced firm financial performance during the 
pre/post financial crisis period. The second objective seeks to find out if gender 
diversity within the corporate board influenced firm financial performance in the 
UK during the pre/post crisis period. Previous empirical results on board commit-
tees, the presence of women on the corporate board and firm financial performance 
have been examined mostly in non-financial firms and have produced mixed em-
pirical results. For example, studies by Klein (1998), Adams and Ferreira (2009), 
Ntim (2013), Leung et al. (2014), Conheady et al. (2014), Gyapong et al. (2015), 
Akbar et al. (2015) and Khosa, (2017) all showed mixed outcomes. This research 
will help unravel the link between the existing internal corporate governance re-
forms such as the three monitoring board committees and board gender diversity 
on the financial performance of UK financial institutions. 
Interestingly, prior empirical research on corporate governance and firm perfor-
mance has been conducted around agency theory (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; 
Ntim, 2009). As a result, agency theory is adopted as the main theoretical framework 
for this study as well. However, agency theory is also supplemented with share-
holder, stakeholder, resource dependence theory and group effective and diversity 
theories. The rational behind the choice of these theories in this research is discussed 
below.  
First, agency theory is defined as “one in which one or more persons (the princi-
pal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976)4. For example, the use of agency theory suggests that the 
establishment of an audit committee helps reduce agency costs and information 
asymmetry by facilitating timely release of unbiased accounting information by 
                                                 
4 The emergence of board committees into the corporate governance structure has been driven by agency 
theory where the agents (managers) have to work in the best interest of the principals (shareholders) (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 2001). Additionally, the establishment of the committees by the board of directors 
has become a market solution to organisational problems by ensuring that the interests of shareholders and 
managers are closely aligned. This will also help to bridge any differences between the agents (managers) 




managers to shareholders and ensures that corporate activities are properly audited 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983, Wild, 1994; Klein, 1998). 
Also, effective monitoring by the audit committee may help minimise financial 
misinformation to shareholders and increase firm financial performance. The use 
of agency theory indicates that the remuneration committee will ensure that share 
options, superannuation payment, commission, bonuses and pension packages 
given to executive management (agent) are in line with the principal’s (sharehold-
ers) expectation and interest. This helps reduce agency problems and increase firm 
financial performance. Additionally, the use of agency theory proposes that the 
nomination committee should appoint the right candidates for the board’s success. 
This minimises the agency conflict by improving board independence and the 
quality of appointed directors, thereby improving the firm’s financial performance 
(Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Vefeas, 1999b). Furthermore, agency theory 
demonstrates that a gender diversified board may help minimise agency conflict 
by improving the board’s monitoring. This is because directors from different 
backgrounds will have a different lens or perspective on the firm’s business activ-
ities (Low et al. 2015). As firms appoint female directors, they see an increase in 
their financial value as a result of extra monitoring, which, in turn, may reduce the 
extent of agency problems (Ntim, 2013).  
Second, stakeholder theory states that corporations should maximise the welfare of a 
number of stakeholders of the firm instead of only its shareholders. Unlike the share-
holder model, the stakeholder theory suggests that corporations should be inclusively 
pursuing the interests of a group of identifiable stakeholders who may either directly 
or indirectly affect the success of the firm (Blair, 1995). Moreover, our empirical 
evidence provides positive reinforcement that stakeholder model offers inclusive 
support for all members within the society to offer their resources in return for the 
expectation that their interests will be promoted (March and Simon, 1958; Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Jensen, 2001, 2002). The stakeholder model advocates that the board-
room composition should be adjusted to reflect the expectations of all stakeholders. 
For example, through the appointment of female directors, in order to increase the 
firm’s financial performance (Low et al. 2015; Blair 1995; Finegold et al. 2007). 
Third, stewardship theory is contrary to agency theory; it posits that executive 
managers are reliable and trustworthy individuals and that they should be empow-
ered to run firms because they are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Letza et al. 2004; Davis et al. 1997). 
Fourth, resource dependence theory suggests that the implementation of internal 
corporate governance structures, such as a board of directors, is not only necessary 
for ensuring that managers are effectively monitored, but also serves as an important 
link between the firm and the critical resources that it needs to maximise financial 
performance (Pfeffer, 1978). Furthermore, our empirical evidence provides positive 
support for resource dependence theory, which suggests that the role of the nomina-
tion committee will ensure that the firm uses its available resources such as back-
ground and skills, experiences and talents for the benefit of shareholders. The nom-




external environment such as competitors and external opportunities in order to in-
crease the firm’s financial performance. Also, resource dependence theory demon-
strates that gender diversity improves the firm’s decision-making and helps align the 
organisation with its external environment and resources, thereby enhancing the 
firm’s financial performance. These benefits occur because women are able to bring 
to the board different attributes, experiences and ideals that lead to a better appreci-
ation of business complexities, which eventually improves the firm’s financial abil-
ity and corporate governance quality as well (Carter et al. 2003; Adams and Fer-
reira, 2009; Carter et al. 2010; Baranchuk and Dybig, 2009). 
Fifth, group effectiveness and diversity theories suggest that people with common 
interests interact and work together (Ruigrok et al. 2006). Further, our empirical 
evidence provides positive support for group effectiveness and diversity theory, 
which suggests that people with complementary backgrounds such as education, 
skills and talent might have the potential to advance the firm’s success through 
their committee membership (Ruigrok et al. 2006). 
Finally, the theories suggest that board committees (i.e. audit, remuneration and 
nomination and board gender diversity) enhance board monitoring, bring diversity 
of ideas and ultimately improve firm performance. 
1.2 The Purpose, Research Questions and Methodology of the Study 
This research has two main purposes; the first is to examine the impact of board 
committees (audit, remuneration, nomination) and the presence of gender diversity 
on the financial performance of UK financial institutions. The second purpose is 
to empirically ascertain if the establishment of these committees and the presence 
of gender diversity impacted firm financial performance during the pre/post global 
financial crisis era.  
In order to achieve the research purpose mentioned above, the following research 
questions will be answered: 
1. Does the establishment of board committees (audit, remuneration and nom-
ination) among UK financial institutions influence their financial perfor-
mance? If so, what were their effects on the firms’ financial performance 
during the pre- and post-financial crisis periods?  
2. Does the presence of women (gender diversity) within the board influence the 
firms’ financial performance and what is the impact of board gender diversity 
on the firms’ financial performance during the pre/post financial crisis periods? 
In achieving the research purposes and addressing the set questions, this study will 
use annual report data extracted from DataStream (Thomson Reuters) for 63 finan-




2011)5. The selected financial institutions include banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, mortgage companies and asset management companies. As sug-
gested by Botosan (1997), annual reports are the major reporting documents to use 
for research and using annual reports is in line with prior studies (e.g. Ho and Wil-
liams, 2003; Cheung et al. 2007; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim, 2009; Ntim 
et al. 2013; Zagorchev and Gao, 2015; Gyapong et al. 2015; Mintah, 2015).   
The sample selection for this research is distinct from previous corporate govern-
ance research because for a firm to be selected it should have a full 12 years of 
annual reports and their dependent variables – that is firm’s value (Tobin’s Q) and 
financial accounting (ROA), together with the controls – must be available on 
DataStream. The available data created a total of 756 firm-year observations. The 
756 firm-year observations are very extensive and unique when compared with 
some previous studies such as April et al. (2003), who received only 20 annual 
reports for examining intellectual capital disclosures among mining firms; 
Zagorchev and Gao (2015), who used 41 corporate governance datasets to cover 
2002-2009; Aanu et al. (2014), who used 25 firms in Nigeria from 2004 to 2011; 
Fire and Meth (1986), who obtained 36 annual reports in order to study the infor-
mation requirements for the analysis of investment companies; and Lee et al. 
(2015), who used only 53 firms with two years’ ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
The dependent variables such as, ROA is defined as the book value of operating 
profit at the end of a financial year, divided by the book value of total assets at the 
end of a financial year (Yermack, 1996; Beiner at al. 2006). ROA measures how 
efficiently and effectively a firm’s managers operate and use its assets to generate 
profits (Ross et al. 1998). On average, a higher ROA suggests effective and effi-
cient use of a firm’s assets in maximising the value of its shareholders’ invest-
ments by the management team (that is, internal corporate governance structures). 
ROA is an effective measure of performance because it eliminates the problem of 
size, which makes it easier for comparisons to be drawn (Lev and Sunder, 1979). 
Demstetz and Lehn (1985) recommend that, for accounting profit, ROA may re-
flect year-to-year fluctuations in underlying business conditions more effectively 
than stock market rates of return. This is because stock market rates of return 
reflect expected future developments that may dissemble current fluctuations in 
underlying business conditions. ROA has been used widely in corporate govern-
ance studies (Core et al. 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; and Cui et al. 2008; 
Ntim, 2009). 
Tobin’s Q (firm value)6, as an additional dependent variable, is defined as the mar-
ket value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity divided by the book value of total assets (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Beiner et 
                                                 
5 DataStream is a database provided by Thomson Reuters known as ‘the world’s leading source of intelli-
gent information for businesses and professionals’. According to Thomson Reuter’s website, the company 
is seen as the world’s most trusted information and news organisation.5 http://thomsonreu-
ters.com/about/awards_recognition/. Accessed on 19/11/17. 
6 Tobin (1969) first introduced the concept of ‘Q’ which was meant to capture a firm’s propensity to invest. 
Since its introduction, ‘Q’ has now come to stay among financial economic researchers as a proxy for 





al. 2006). Tobin’s Q will be used as a measure of financial performance; that is, as 
a proxy for the market’s valuation of the quality of a firm’s internal corporate gov-
ernance structures. This study will follow Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approxima-
tion of Q, which has been demonstrated as correlated 96.6% with the original Q-
ratio7. It is normally referred to as the ratio of the market value of the outstanding 
financial claims on a firm with regards to the current replacement cost of its assets. 
The Q-ratio measures the effectiveness with which a firm’s management is able to 
use its assets to generate value for shareholders (Lewellen and Bradrinath, 1997). 
A higher Q-ratio suggests greater effectiveness of a firm’s internal corporate gov-
ernance structures, as well as a better perception of a company’s financial perfor-
mance by the market (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Tobin’s Q has been used extensively as a proxy for financial performance, not only 
in corporate governance literature (Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al. 2003; Henry, 
2008) but also in corporate finance literature (Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Perfect and 
Wiles, 1994). This gives it an advantageous performance proxy because its empir-
ical validity is grounded in a rigorously established empirical literature. 
The decision to use these two financial measures is for two reasons. First, prior 
evidence suggests that insiders (managers) and outsiders (shareholders and other 
stakeholders) value corporate governance in different ways (Black et al. 2006). 
The accounting-based measure of performance (ROA) attempts to capture the 
wealth effects of corporate governance mechanisms from the perspective of com-
pany management (insiders), while the market-based measure (Q-ratio) represents 
the financial valuation of corporate governance structures by investors (outsiders). 
These two measures have also been used by prior studies (e.g. Black et al. 2006; 
Henry, 2008; Gompers et al. 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al. 2015). In the same vein, this current research will 
also follow prior empirical studies and use ROA and Tobin’s Q as dependent var-
iables.  
Second, each financial measure has its own strengths and weaknesses with no con-
sensus within the literature on a particular measure as being the ‘best or better’ 
proxy for financial performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Hence, using the two 
measures represents an attempt to examine the strongest of the results against both 
accounting- (ROA) and market-based measures (Tobin’s Q) of financial perfor-
mance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The use of these two financial measures will 
help to ascertain the empirical results attained while using accounting (ROA) and 
market-based measures (Tobin’s Q). In order to obtain the appropriate financial 
measure during the pre/post financial crisis era, the use of ROA and Tobin’s Q will 
be examined. 
In order to eliminate the influence of other firm characteristics on the results, the 
following control variables were used including: growth, capital structure, firm size, 
                                                 
7 Approximations for Tobin’s Q have also been developed by Lindenberg and Rose (1981), Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989), Perfect and Wiles (1994), and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), among others. How-
ever, Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximation is adopted here because it does not only correlate highly 
(96.6%) with the original Q, but also is simple and less costly in terms of computational effort and intensity 




big four, foreign/dual-listing (DUAL), industry and year dummies. These controls 
were chosen based on corporate governance theories and other prior empirical 
studies (see, for example, Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Van Lent, 2007; Larker and 
Rusticus, 2008; Black et al. 2006; Henry, 2008; Gompers et al. 2003; Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2013; Gyapong et al. 
2015; Ntim et al. 2015; Mintah, 2015 and 2016). The use of these controls will 
help prevent any omitted variables bias and endogeneity (Chenhall and Moers, 
2007; Ntim, 2009).  
To analyse the data for this research, panel data analysis such as Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) and Random Effects (RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) models were used. 
Panel data analysis favours several consecutive years of data (Cheng et al. 2008). 
The merit of using panel data is that it has more degrees of freedom; less colline-
arity among variables; more cross-sectional and time series variability; more effi-
ciency; and accounts for more observable firm-level heterogeneity in individual-
specific variables (Gujarati, 2003; Cheng et al. 2008; Ntim et al. 2013; Danso and 
Adomako, 2014; Krause and Tse, 2016). The use of panel data in corporate gov-
ernance research minimises inherent statistical problems, such as endogeneity 
(Larcker and Rusticus, 2007). Additionally, previous corporate governance re-
searchers also used panel data (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Gompers et al. 2003; 
Klapper and Love, 2004; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Guest, 2009; Ntim, 2013; 
Gyapong et al. 2015; Ntim et al. 2015). Third, using panel data is in line with 
conventional capital market-based research (Fama, 1965). For instance, OLS is 
used to analyse the relationships that exist between the variables. However, ac-
cording to the Durbin-Hausman test, fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) 
regression should be preferred. The use of a fixed effects (FE) model deals with 
analysing variables that change with time; fixed effects control for all time-invar-
iance coefficients; assumes that the coefficient cannot be biased; and takes care of 
endogeneity problems. The random effects (RE) model, on the other hand, helps 
to measure variation across entities. It also deals with any issues relating to heter-
ogeneity in the regression and with any exogeneity problems. Depending on the 
particular paper, either of these regression estimates have been used in order to 
ascertain the empirical outcome and to check if some of the results could be con-
sistent with each other. 
Collectively, the empirical results ascertained from the research purpose, questions 
and methodology first indicate that the establishment of the three monitoring com-
mittees (audit, remuneration, nomination) and the presence of women on the UK 
corporate board had a positive and statistically significant link on the firms’ finan-
cial performance. Subsequent tests conducted during the pre- and post-2007/08 
financial crisis periods show mixed results. Specifically, the pre-crisis results show 
that these monitoring board committees and board gender diversity remained pos-
itive and statistically significant before the 07/08 financial crisis. However, the 
post-crisis period results were not statistically significant, indicating that the 07/08 
financial crisis appeared to have affected the financial performance of the financial 
institutions examined. A reasonable explanation is that, even though the financial 
crisis was over from 2009 to 2011, the entire UK economy experienced an eco-




various banks. Investors and shareholders were unwilling to invest in companies, 
especially financial institutions, because of a fear they might lose their investment. 
Banks in the UK were also unwilling to lend to businesses. Furthermore, the harsh 
macro-economic conditions globally and in the UK after the crisis overshadowed 
the importance of firms having board committees and the presence of women on 
the corporate board (Review of HM Treasury’s response to the financial crisis re-
port, 2012)8. These situations impaired the efficiency of the entire financial market 
and also affected the 2009 to 2011 financial years, irrespective of whether firms 
had robust corporate governance mechanisms in place or not. 
The result supports the theoretical expectations that better-governed firms should 
be associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts 
(Black et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2007; Ntim, 2009). Even though the ‘Comply or 
Explain’ nature of corporate governance in the UK offers an optional regulation to 
firms, the results obtained indicate that the establishment of these monitoring com-
mittees does not only become a market solution to organisational problems but can 
also accelerate firms’ financial performance (Black et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2007; 
Ntim, 2009).  
1.3 Motivation and the Reasons for Examining UK Financial Institutions 
The selection of UK financial institutions instead of other corporate establishments 
is based on the following reasons. First, prior to the start of my PhD programme, I 
worked in a number of UK financial institutions, which offered me the opportunity 
to understand how continuous corporate governance reforms affect financial insti-
tutions policies in terms of compliance. Also, working in UK financial institutions 
provided me with the first-hand information as to how these firms acted and an 
understanding of the various corporate governance mechanisms put forward by the 
government during the pre/post financial crisis era. This research will empirically 
ascertain if the existence of the monitoring board committees and the presence of 
women on the board (which are important corporate governance policies) could 
have an impact on the firms’ financial performance during the pre/post crisis pe-
riod. This will serve as the first drive for this research. 
Second, the financial sector in the UK, for instance, is the biggest in Europe and 
the second biggest in the world, after the US. According to the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS, 2015), the sector provides a major source of revenue to the gov-
ernment, employment to citizens, returns to shareholders and foreign exchange to 
the economy (BoE and HM Treasury 2015; Mintah, 2015). Due to the uniqueness 
of the sector to the country’s development, its corporate governance mechanism 
goes beyond shareholders to include stakeholders (Hopt, 2013; Mehran and Mol-
lineaux, 2012). 
 
                                                 




The third motivation steering this study is that the choice of UK financial institu-
tions research is unique and different from non-financial firms because financial 
institutions are highly regulated and very volatile compared to other sectors of the 
economy (Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Zagorchev and Gao, 2015). High regulation 
on financial institutions means that they have to pay a deposit to the Bank of Eng-
land (BoE) as insurance for customers in case of any uncertainty (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2003; Zagorchev and Gao, 2015). Also, financial institutions in the UK 
are controlled, monitored and regulated by the Bank of England (BoE); the Finan-
cial Conduct Authority (FCA); and the London Stock Exchange (LSE), for firms 
listed on the Stock Exchange. Apart from the domestic controls, international bod-
ies such as the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International 
Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank also help in terms of policies and regulatory guidance 
as to how these financial institutions should operate in line with global standards 
(Berger et al.1995; Zagorchev and Gao, 2015; HM Treasury, 2015; Mintah, 2016). 
International regulatory policies and guidance create some uniqueness in financial 
institutions’ corporate governance as compared to other firms. 
Fourth, unlike other sectors of the economy, the financial sector businesses are 
very complex to control and manage, as they require adequate knowledge and ex-
perience from decision-makers. However, the value generation process in the fi-
nancial sector is different compared to many other sectors. The board of directors 
in every financial institution needs to understand all complex financial products 
such as swap, derivative, the economic indicators, risk to the company and their 
controls. Any failure of responsibility on the part of management and the board of 
directors will have consequences for the entire financial sector (Hopt, 2013). In 
addition, the financial sector is tightly interconnected. Because of this complexity, 
researchers often exclude financial institutions’ data from their sample when con-
ducting empirical studies, yet they are central to the functioning of the broader 
economy, including non-financial firms (Ntim, 2013, 2017; Yermack, 1996; 
Guest, 2009; Lim et al. 2007; Levine, 2003). This research will take advantage of 
this and focus on financial institutions. 
Fifth, unlike other firms, there are continuous corporate governance reforms in the 
financial institutions to deal with any challenges that might disrupt the sector due 
to the complex nature of its products and services. This obviously makes the cor-
porate governance mechanism in the financial sector unique from other firms as it 
always requires continuous improvement in dealing with any new challenges (ex-
amples of such reforms are the Cadbury Report, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 
1998; Combined Code, 1998, 2003, 2006; Turnbull, 1999, 2005; Myners, 2001; 
Higgs, 2003; Tyson, 2003; Smith, 2003). Also, the financial crisis in 2007/2008 
led to the establishment of additional corporate governance reforms by the UK 
government. These reforms include the Walker Review (2009), Financial Services 
Bill (2010) and the FRC (2012, 2014, 2016). There was also the creation of the 
new Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) by the Bank of England (BoE) and the 
Single Financial Regulator known as the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 




cover any overlaps in corporate governance policies and avoid future market fail-
ures in UK financial institutions. As it stands, none of the corporate governance 
reforms have been empirically tested on financial institutions and their impact on 
firm financial performance is not yet known. This research will empirically test 
this.  
Sixth, corporate governance in the UK is normally a self-regulation or voluntary 
compliance regime (‘Comply or Explain’) rather than the US-style of mandatory 
regime (‘comply or else’). This means that each financial institution can either 
comply with a code or provide reasons for non-compliance. Firms that do not com-
ply with the codes should have an alternative practice, similar to those firms that 
do comply (FRC, 2014; Akbar et al. 2015; Mintah, 2016). This research will col-
lectively determine firm financial performance for UK financial institutions which 
complied with the adoption of board committees such as audit, remuneration and 
nomination and the presence of gender diversity among their corporate board. This 
comply or explain nature in UK corporate governance will offer opportunities to 
empirically ascertain firms which complied with the reforms and make contribu-
tions to the extant literature.  
The seventh motivation driving the board gender diversity research in the UK is 
that gender diversity issues are very important to several countries. For example, 
the European Commission (EC) has been considering imposing quotas for female 
representation on corporate boards across the EU. In addition, lobbying groups 
such as Women Corporate Directors (WCD) are actively pushing for more women 
to be present in the boardroom9. Gender diversity research in the UK will help 
enhance the implementation of the policy in the UK, and the outcome of this re-
search will provide empirical support to any group interested in gender issues and 
contribute immensely to the gender research gap (Mintah and Schadewitz, 2017). 
Finally, the UK operates under the Anglo-American business model where com-
panies exist primarily to ‘maximise shareholder’s value and interest’ (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 1997). This is based on the assumption that ownership is separate 
from control in an Anglo-American model (Berle and Means, 1932). The Anglo-
American model can succeed when the board committees and board composition 
are aimed at serving the purposes of maximising shareholders’ value and interests 
in the firms.  
This research is very unique because, as it stands, no empirical research has been 
undertaken in UK financial institutions up to this point. The research will also help 
fill any gap in the corporate governance research literature. 
 
                                                 




1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises the following, chapter two covers the theoretical back-
ground.  
Chapter three discusses the global financial crisis during the 2007/08 period. This 
section gives the full details of the causes of the financial crisis.  
Chapter four discusses corporate governance issues in UK financial institutions 
and various reforms which have taken place.  
Chapter five discusses the role and functions of the board and its committees. The 
establishment of board committees, namely audit, remuneration and nomination, 
and the presence of gender diversity within the board are all discussed.  
Chapter six gives the summary and contributions of each articles. 






2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is a system whereby directors are entrusted with the respon-
sibilities and duties concerning the affairs of the firm (Sheikh and Chatterjee, 
1995). In order to achieve these responsibilities, the board of directors form com-
mittees where individual directors bring their specialist knowledge and expertise. 
The committees scrutinise the highest decision-making within the firm and provide 
solutions to organisational problems by liaising between shareholders and manag-
ers (Harrison, 1987). In addressing the functions and responsibilities of the board 
committees, this research will have these purposes: first, to ascertain if board com-
mittees and the representation of women among UK financial institutions improve 
firm financial performance; and, second, to examine if board committees and the 
representation of women impacted the firm financial performance during the 
pre/post global financial crisis era.  
To achieve these research purposes above, theories such as shareholder, stake-
holder, agency, stewardships, resource dependency theory and group effective-
ness will help to find answers to the research questions and gives a better under-
standing as to why we should pursue this research empirically. Specifically, these 
theories trace the corporate governance-financial performance relationship liter-
ature and develop the hypotheses among the variables examined (Ntim, 2009). 
The use of these theories is in line with previous empirical studies (such as Ham-
brick and Mason, 1984; Main and Johnston, 1993; Murphy, 1998; Carter et al. 
2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Ruigrok et al. 2006; Campbell and Minguez-
Vera, 2008; Adler, 2010; Ntim, 2009; Ntim et al. 2013; Nguyen et al. 2015; Per-
ryman et al. 2016).  
Section 2.2 discusses the definition of corporate governance and the subsequent 
sections deal with the supporting theories for the research. 
2.2 Discussions of the Content of Corporate Governance 
The term ‘Governance’ comes from the Latin word ‘gubernare’, which means to 
control, govern or steer. Corporate governance refers to the ‘act or process of gov-
erning’, which is a never-ending process (Tricker, 1984). Corporate governance 
deals with ‘who controls corporations and why’. The ‘who’ is the owners of the 




ownership, social responsibility, economic progress and the role of the markets in 
ensuring that there is stability (Colley et al. 2005)10.    
A modern corporation, according to Berle and Means (1932), deals with a limited 
liability company where the owners are not personally liable for the debts or any 
legal obligation of the firm. Here, management is separated from corporate control, 
where the owner does not have direct involvement in the business. Corporate gov-
ernance can work better where shareholders receive reliable and trustworthy infor-
mation to monitor and evaluate management decisions. These decisions will help 
set stock prices based on expected profitability and risk (Colley et al. 2005; Berle 
and Means, 1932). 
Recent corporate governance research has increased in the last decade (Gillan, 
2006). It is a subject which derives from different disciplines including finance, 
accounting, economics, ethics, law, management, politics, psychology, business 
history and organisational behaviour. Different researchers define corporate gov-
ernance differently. In fact, there is no universally accepted definition (Keasey et 
al. 1997; Denis et al. 2001; Gillan, 2006; Ntim, 2018).    
Corporate governance has been narrowly defined as “the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their invest-
ment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737). This definition means that corporations 
exist to maximise the wealth of their owners (West, 2006). The Cadbury Report 
(1992, s.2.5) defined corporate governance as the “system by which companies are 
directed and controlled”. The Cadbury Report set the foundation for corporate 
governance ‘best practice’ in the UK and other countries in the world which incor-
porated some or all of its recommendations into their own corporate governance 
codes. Parkinson (1993, p.159) defined corporate governance as the “process of 
supervision and control intended to ensure that the company’s management acts 
in accordance with the interests of shareholders”. Here, supervision and control 
will reduce agency cost and achieve shareholders’ objectives. 
Gregory (2001) also defines corporate governance as the means by which a firm’s 
managers are held accountable to capital providers. Here, managers become very 
responsible to the principal, who is the provider of capital to the company. Monks 
and Minow (2001) see corporate governance as the relationship among sharehold-
ers, management and board as it helps to determine the direction and performance 
of corporations. This definition focuses on internal corporate governance and 
                                                 
10 As the world economy flourished globally, it created capitalism, which resulted in a very small number 
of people becoming very wealthy while the rest stayed poor; the wealthy people could not be trusted as 
they created great personal wealth at the expense of their customers, workers and the public. The govern-
ment responded by creating laws and regulations intended to limit the excesses and abuses of the free and 
unrestrained market which existed at the time (see, Colley et al. 2005, pp. 2-6).  
In the end, capitalism created an opportunity for governments to be vigilant in business activities. This 
created the chance for businesses to unite their capital (money) and grow larger, making each investor to own 
a portion or shares of the businesses in which they invested and thus they became known as shareholders. The 
shareholders (owners) elect directors as their representatives to manage the affairs of the business. The board 
of director’s delegates responsibility to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) whom they hire to handle the day-
to-day affairs of the company. The CEO then becomes accountable to the board of directors, which collectively 




shareholders. Denis et al. (2001) affirm that corporate governance allows self-in-
terested managers (the controllers) to maximise the value of the firm on behalf of 
shareholders (the owners). Here, corporate governance gives managers a respon-
sibility to achieve shareholder value. 
Similarly, corporate governance has also been defined as “a system whereby direc-
tors are entrusted with responsibilities and duties in relation to the direction of a 
company’s affairs” (Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p. 5) or “ways of ensuring that 
corporate actions, agents and assets are directed at achieving the corporate objec-
tive established by the corporation’s shareholders” (Sternberg, 2004, p.28). These 
definitions mean that, in order to maximise the wealth of owners or shareholders, 
there is a need for an assembly of shareholders, board of directors and executive 
management (Letza et al. 2004; West, 2006); this makes the corporation accountable 
to its shareholders, by ensuring that they appoint the right directors and that the right 
governance mechanisms exist (Cadbury Report, 1992; Ntim, 2009). 
Shareholders have the power to reject board decisions or remove board members from 
office in a general meeting; however, the board of directors is responsible for ensuring 
that the company is properly governed. These responsibilities include setting the com-
pany’s strategic aims, providing well-qualified leaders to put the strategy into action, 
supervising management performance, firing management for incompetence and re-
porting to shareholders for their stewardship (Cadbury Report, 1992; Ntim, 2018). 
The above definitions of corporate governance focus on the relationship between the 
manager and the shareholder, which is seen as very narrow (Ntim, 2009). 
A ‘narrow’ governance structure can be seen in cases where it concentrates on key 
internal governance mechanisms that interact to satisfy shareholders’ value; that 
is, it is only for the benefit of shareholders instead of that of all stakeholders (Stern-
berg, 2004). 
Sir Adrian Cadbury during the World Bank Report (1999, p.vii)‘broadly’ defined 
corporate governance as being “concerned with holding the balance between eco-
nomic and social goals and between individual and communal goals, the aim is to 
align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society”. 
Tricker (1984, p.6) defines corporate governance as a “direction, which helps to over-
see and control the executive actions of management so that they can satisfy legiti-
mate expectations of accountability and regulation beyond the corporate bounda-
ries”. This latter definition means that, once there is a clear regulation for manage-
ment to follow, shareholders and other stakeholders can go beyond the corporate 
boundaries to hold management accountable for their actions. Similarly, the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2004, p.11) broadly 
defines corporate governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives, 
where performance monitoring is determined or the system of checks and balances, 
both internal and external to companies, which ensure that companies discharge 
their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in 




These definitions mean that corporate governance goes beyond the internal corpo-
rate structure to include external stakeholders as well (OECD, 2004; Gillan, 2006; 
Mallin, 2007). As defined, internal corporate governance structures will include 
shareholders, the board of directors and the executive management, whilst the ex-
ternal corporate governance mechanism will include shareholders, the legal sys-
tem, all staff in the organisation, executive directors, customers, regulators, local 
communities, the government, debtors and creditors. This means that the corpora-
tion exists as a social entity which is accountable and responsible to all stakehold-
ers (Freeman et al. 1983; Mallin, 2007). 
The aim of the ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ corporate governance structures is to examine 
how both external and internal governance mechanisms can be run in order to max-
imise firm value, and increase performance for the benefit of shareholders and 
other stakeholders as well (Freeman et al. 1983; Mallin, 2007; Aguilera et al. 2009; 
Ding et al. 2008). 
 A ‘narrow’ corporate governance structure is often referred to as ‘shareholding’ 
because it focuses on companies to ensure that they become accountable and re-
sponsible to shareholders, whilst the ‘broad’ corporate governance structure is of-
ten called ‘stakeholding’ because it perceives firms to be responsible and account-
able to all stakeholders (Freeman et al.1983; Mallin, 2007; Aguilera et al. 2009; 
Ding et al. 2008). 
The models of corporate governance have both national and legal origins. Specif-
ically, the ‘shareholder’ model is more common in Anglo-American countries such 
as the UK and US which have common law origins, whilst the ‘stakeholder’ cor-
porate governance structure is common in continental Europe and Asia; that is, 
Germany and Japan, respectively (Mallin, 2006; Aguilera et al. 2009).  
The next section will give detailed information about the shareholder model. 
2.2.1 The Shareholder Model 
Shareholders’ ideology has become entrenched as a principle of corporate govern-
ance among companies based in the US and UK (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1997; 
Ntim, 2009). The OECD principles of corporate governance which were issued in 
1999 state that “corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interest of 
shareholders” (OECD, 1999, p.15). This means that companies exist primarily to 
“maximise shareholders’ value and interest” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1997, 
p.13). This is also based on the assumption that ownership is separate from control 
in the Anglo-American model (Berle and Means, 1932); that is to say, the provid-
ers of capital, the owners and/or shareholders, surrender the day-to-day manage-
ment (control) of the business to a group of managers consisting of a ‘Unitary’ 
board of directors and executive management who are most often not owners of 
the business. Multiplicity of shareholders or ownership in this corporate govern-




The implication of dispersed ownership is that the power of shareholders to exer-
cise control over the way their business is run is greatly impaired (Blair, 1995; La 
porta et al. 1998). This raises the issue of agency problems: the agency theory 
suggests that shareholders have to delegate the control of their business to a few 
directors and managers who then become the agents to run the company on their 
behalf, but there is a risk that these directors and managers will pursue their own 
interests to the detriment of the owner (shareholders) (Smith, 1776; Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is because managers are both op-
portunistic and rational, meaning that the majority of managers and directors are 
more likely to pursue their own interests rather than those of the shareholders (Wei-
mer and Pape, 1999). 
However, the shareholder model also offers solutions to the agency problem. First, 
it suggests that restrictions on factor markets must be removed to encourage com-
petition (Letza et al. 2004). Second, it calls for the introduction of a voluntary cor-
porate governance code of ethics and conduct, which is supported by business prin-
ciples of accountability, discipline, fairness and transparency, to regulate managers 
and directors’ behaviour (Cadbury Report, 1992). Third, it suggests the strengthen-
ing of the managerial incentive system by instituting performance-linked executive 
compensation schemes to help align shareholder-managerial interests (Weimer and 
Pape, 1999). It also calls for an efficient contract governing the relationship between 
the owners of capital and labour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Letza et al. 2004). 
However, the shareholding model rejects external interventions and additional ob-
ligations imposed on corporations by government and central authorities because 
they can distort free market operations (Hart, 1995). Instead, it perceives a firm’s 
existing governance arrangements as the outcome of a bargaining process, which 
has been freely entered into by corporate insiders and outsiders (Keasey et al. 
1997). Specifically, as part of an economic model, it assumes that factor markets 
such as capital and managerial labour are efficient, self-regulated and backed by 
additional voluntary mechanisms such as voluntary corporate governance codes 
which are more effective in reducing the divergent activities of managers (Keasey 
et al. 1997; Letza et al. 2004). 
The rejection of external interventions by central regulatory authorities which rely 
on free market regulation is also based on a core premise that the major source of 
finance to a corporation is equity instead of debt financing (Ntim, 2009). Equity 
capital is raised from the capital market where capital can move to investment that 
offers the highest risk-adjusted returns (Friedman, 1970). Equity markets are well 
developed in Anglo-American countries, such as the UK and US, more than in 
continental European countries like Germany and France, helping shareholders in 
Anglo-American countries to easily transfer their capital from a poorly-governed 
company to a better-governed one (Weimer and Pape, 1999)11.  
Despite all the good aspects of the shareholder model (Keasey et al. 1997), the model 
still has several drawbacks (Blair, 1995; Gamble and Kelly, 2001). These include 
                                                 
11 The introduction of institutional investors has sped up the convergence of corporate governance systems 




shareholder power and democracy, stakeholder interests, social morality and ethics, 
efficient factor markets and an excessive short-term emphasis (Blair, 1995; Letza et 
al. 2004; Sternberg, 1997 and 2004). The first drawback of the shareholder model, 
according to Blair (1995), is that shareholders lack sufficient power to control man-
agement and prevent misuse of corporate resources as reported by the shareholder 
model. The shareholder model argues that corporations should be primarily estab-
lished for the benefit of shareholders, so that power can rest entirely with the share-
holders in order for them to choose the persons to whom business operational power 
should be delegated (Blair, 1995; Letza et al. 2004; Sternberg, 1997 and 2004). This 
entitles them to hire or fire a board of directors at an annual general meeting (AGM) 
(Schwartz, 1983; Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995). In practice, it has been argued that 
the ability of shareholders to exercise meaningful control over the direction of their 
company is very limited by the same procedures which govern such meetings and 
corporate officers’ elections, since it is the directors rather than shareholders that 
generally set the agenda for the AGM, which means that directors can determine the 
issues that come up for voting (Blair, 1995; Sternberg, 2004).  
The second weakness of the shareholder model is the lack of real shareholder power 
where directors, who are expected to be the first line of defence for shareholders, 
also suffer from many imperfections (Denis and McConnel, 2003; Brennan, 2006). 
Sternberg (2004) argued that, because the executive directors of a corporation are 
also normally its managers, they are less willing to recognise or correct their own 
mistakes. While non-executive directors’ accountability to shareholders usually 
arises in the way in which they are nominated, officially appointed and remunerated 
(Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Sternberg, 2004), in an Anglo-American 
model, the appointment procedure is such that most non-executive directors are 
nominated by the chief executive or the board themselves, making them insuffi-
ciently independent of management and insufficiently accountable to shareholders 
(Vinten, 2001; Sternberg, 2004). The increase in corporate governance reforms, in 
the Anglo-American countries, has led to an improved procedure for appointing 
board members (Aguilera and Cuervo, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009).12 
The third criticism of the model is the short-termism of activities which has also 
been levelled against the Anglo-American corporate governance model, where 
they are interested in short-term financial performance such as short-term returns 
on investments, short-term corporate profits, short-term management perfor-
mance, short-term share prices and short-term expenditures. This arises because of 
substantial reliance on the existence of an efficient capital market, which also puts 
huge pressure on managers to perform for short-term gains instead of focusing on 
long-term profit (Blair, 1995; Keasey et al. 1997; Kakabadse and Korac-Kaka-
badse, 2002; Letza et al. 2004). A recent review of corporate governance suggested 
that the financial crisis that was the ‘Credit Crunch’ in the global financial markets 
was partly caused by ‘reckless risk-taking behaviour’ which is associated with a 
‘short-term bonus culture’ among senior executives of major financial institutions 
                                                 
12 The UK’s 2006 Combined Code, for example, made all listed firms establish independent nomination 





in the UK and US (Walker Review, 2009; Ntim, 2009; Financial Service, Bill 
2010). 
Another attack on the shareholder model is that it ignores the social, ethical and 
moral responsibilities of the corporation as an important societal institution (Free-
man and Reed, 1983; Blair, 1995; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). Other 
models, such as the stakeholder model, advocate the belief that businesses should 
be run to maximise the wealth of all shareholders and equally serve the interests 
of the wider stakeholder groups such as employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, 
local communities and the government (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Berle and 
Means, 1932; Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995). As a result of this, the Anglo-Ameri-
can model’s exclusive emphasis on the powers and rights of shareholders results 
in ignoring the interest of other legitimate stakeholders (Blair, 1995). 
The shareholder model has also been criticised as lacking the capacity to give se-
rious consideration to ethical and moral issues. A controversial ethical and moral 
criticism is that the Anglo-American governance model encourages excessive ex-
ecutive remuneration13 (Sternberg, 2004). According to Kakabadse and Korac-Ka-
kabadse (2002), the average CEO of a medium-sized American corporation earns 
531 times more in pay, bonuses and stock options than an average factory worker; 
although good corporate governance is expected to empower the weaker sections 
of society14 (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). 
However, the last decade has seen an increase in corporate social responsibilities 
in Anglo-American countries15 towards employees, customers, the local environ-
ment, local communities and governments, making shareholders part of the stake-
holders of the firm; therefore, if shareholders’ values are maximised then societal 
value is similarly maximised (Mallin, 2007; Jensen, 2002; Ntim, 2009). The stake-
holder model will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2.2 The Stakeholder Model 
The stakeholder model states that corporations should maximise the welfare of a 
number of stakeholders of the firm instead of only its shareholders. Unlike the 
shareholder model, where corporations are established exclusively for the interests 
of shareholders, the stakeholder model suggests that corporations should be inclu-
sively pursuing the interests of a group of identifiable stakeholders who may either 
                                                 
13 Excessive remuneration may not be limited to Anglo-American countries alone because the 2009 Mercer 
Global Executive Remuneration Survey suggested that executive remuneration is not only high in share-
holding countries like the UK and US but also traditional stakeholder countries such as the Netherlands, 
Germany and France (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
14 The lower or weaker sections of society are lower-level employees, unskilled and semi-skilled staff. The 
financial crisis has shown that, despite government intervention to bail-out most banks using taxpayers’ 
money, senior executives continue to pay themselves high salaries and bonuses, which eventually means 
that wealth will be transferred from ordinary taxpayers to already rich senior banking executives (Keller 
and Stocker, 2008; Farrell, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). 




directly or indirectly affect the success of the firm. Stakeholders include staff, cus-
tomers, creditors, debtors, local communities and the government, an ideology of-
ten found in Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, other European countries, Japan 
and other Asian countries (Blair, 1995; Ntim, 2009).  
The stakeholder model has offered an inclusive governance concept where it is sug-
gested that firms are made up of social groups in which each group can be seen as 
supplying the firm with important resources or contributions and in return should ex-
pect their interests to be promoted (March and Simon, 1958; Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Jensen, 2001 and 2002). It acknowledges all the contributions made by each variable 
in the model; that is, shareholders supply the firm with capital while they receive a 
risk-adjusted return on their investment. Creditors provide loans to the firm, and in 
return they want the loan to be repaid with interest and on time. Local communities 
also supply businesses with their location, local infrastructure and workers and, in 
exchange, expect the firm to improve the quality of life in the communities. Managers 
and employees also provide the firm with their time and skills; in return, they expect 
to receive a sustainable income from the organisation. The government also provides 
roads, electricity, water, and laws governing corporation and competition, and in re-
turn it expects firms to pay their corporation and income tax to help its social devel-
opment (Hill and Jones, 1992; Jensen, 2001 and 2002; Ntim, 2009).  
The stakeholder governance model argues that the absence of broader stakeholder 
participation in the running of public corporations will always cause a problem in 
the shareholder model (Letza et al. 2004). Specifically, Keasey et al. (1997) argue 
that agency conflict could be reduced by firms through contracts between the var-
ious stakeholders of the firm, and that the firm should be run rationally in economic 
terms to broadly maximise the wealth of all stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
This rejects the assumption that shareholders are the only key important people in 
the firm (Blair, 1995). 
The stakeholder model offers several solutions: it proposes a two-tier corporate 
board structure as a way of achieving a broader representation of the interests of a 
larger group of stakeholders of the firm (Schilling, 2001; Mallin, 2007). For ex-
ample, in a stakeholder governance framework like France, companies will nor-
mally have a dual board structure where the first structure is a supervisory board 
and the second structure is management. The supervisory board consists of inves-
tors who are shareholders and creditors, employees (union groups), suppliers, cus-
tomers and government appointees who represent a group in the society (Schilling, 
2001). The supervisory board then mandates management to run the company in 
the interest of all stakeholders (Schilling, 2001; Mallin, 2007). However, the gov-
ernance framework in the UK is based on a one-tier system where a single board 
is formed to run the affairs of the firm. 
The stakeholder model also encourages corporate management to focus on build-
ing trust and long-term relationships between the firm and its stakeholders (Letza 
et al. 2004). It supports and encourages closer contact between shareholders, cred-
itors, managers, employees and suppliers, and the integration of business ethics as 




According to La Porta et al. (1998), there is a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and investor protection, which can be explained by legal origin. For 
example, the Anglo-America countries like UK and US have dispersed ownership 
with higher investor protection comparable with other countries like continental Eu-
ropean and Asian countries such as Germany, France and Japan which tend to have 
high ownership concentration with weaker investor protection (Ntim, 2009). 
The stakeholder model has also received several criticisms. The first criticism is 
that it is not compatible with the concept of business (Sternberg, 1997 and 2004; 
Letza et al. 2004), making corporations strive to achieve a fair balance in distrib-
uting the benefits of the firm to a number of stakeholders, which prevents the firm 
from pursuing a single objective function that favours particular groups (Sternberg 
1997; Jensen 2001 and 2002). This is not consistent with the notion of business 
where the returns of capital invested (shareholders) benefit all stakeholders (Stern-
berg, 1997; Jensen 2001 and 2002). 
The second criticism is that the stakeholder model makes the number of people 
whose needs and benefits the company needs to take into consideration simply 
unlimited (Freeman, 1984; Hummels, 1998; Sternberg, 1997 and 2004). This 
means that stakeholders could be anybody ranging from employees to debtors, 
creditors and the government, among others. Yet, it is mandated that a balance be 
struck in the distribution of benefits to all stakeholders. This divergent balance 
among stakeholders’ interests is sometimes an unworkable objective (Sternberg, 
1997 and 2004; Jensen, 2001 and 2002). 
The third criticism is that the stakeholder model is incompatible with the corporate 
governance concept of accountability, where directors have to be accountable to 
shareholders, managers to directors, employees to managers, and managers and 
directors become accountable to shareholders (Sternberg, 1997 and 2004; 
Rossouw et al. 2002; Solomon, 2007). The stakeholder model recommends that 
firms should be accountable to all their stakeholders rather than only their share-
holders (Friedman and Reed, 1983; Letza et al. 2004). It has been argued that mul-
tiple accountability works if the purpose is unambiguous to everyone involved 
(Sternberg, 1997 and 2004; Gamble and Kelly, 2001).  
The fourth criticism is that the stakeholder model provides no effective standard 
against which corporate agents can be judged (Sternberg, 1997 and 2004; Letza et 
al. 2004). That is, corporate agents are mandated to run the business primarily to 
balance all stakeholders’ interests.16  
Table 1 below presents a summary of the shareholder and stakeholder models of 
corporate governance, with agency theory following afterwards.  
                                                 
16 The rise in globalisation and the liberalisation of the stock market are increasing converging stakeholder 
and shareholder models together. For example, the stock market in Japan, a traditional stakeholder model, 
is as well developed as its counterparts in the UK and US which reflect the shareholder model (Filatotchev 




Table 1: Summary of the Shareholder and Stakeholder Models of Corporate Governance 
Summary Shareholder Model Stakeholder Model 
Theoretical Assumption   
Purpose of corporation 
 
Maximisation of shareholder 
Value 
Maximisation of all stakehold-
ers’ wealth 
Problem of governance Agency Problem Absence of stakeholders’ par-
ticipation 
Cause of problem 
 
Shareholders do not have 
enough control 
Governance failure to represent  
stakeholders’ interests 
Background Separation of ownership and 
control 
Different style of capitalism 
Assumptions about causation Self-interested human 
behaviour 
Traditional mentality of private 
capitalism 
Type of economic organisation 
 
Rational economic unit with 
profit motive 
Social economic unit with 
stakeholder welfare motive 
Proposition Market efficiency of economy Social efficiency of economy 
Rejection Any external interventions The principal-agent model 
Source of discipline External market forces Internal social forces 
Major features   
Board structure One-tier (executive and non-
executive board) 
Two-tier (executive and super-
visory boards) 
Major source of finance Equity from the capital markets Debt from banks 
Role of capital markets High Low 
Role of banks Low High 
Ownership concentration Low/diffused High/concentrated 
Regulatory orientation Self-regulation Statutory regulation 
Legal system/ origin Common law/Anglo American: 
UK, US/commonwealth 
Civil law/continental Europe: 
France, Germany and Japan 
Time horizon of economic 
benefits 
Short-term Long-term 
Major Solutions   
Solution Removing restrictions on mar-
kets. Strengthening the incen-
tive system. Introducing a vol-
untary code of governance. In-
troduction of a combination of 
efficient contracts 
Trust and long-term contractual 
associations between the firm 
and stakeholders.  
Inter-firm co-operation. 
Employee participation 
Introducing business ethics 






2.2.3 Agency Theory 
If a business is owned by numerous shareholders or the general public, this affects 
the way in which it is controlled (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). The shareholders 
of the business (owners) delegate the running of the company to management 
(agent); Berle and Means (1932) discussed this process as a divorce of ownership 
and control which has created the ‘agency problem’. Agency theory can be traced 
back to Berle and Means (1932) and to Adam Smith’s (1776) book entitled ‘The 
Wealth of Nations’. Smith argued that company directors (agents) were not likely 
to be as careful with other people’s money (principal) as with their own (Letza et 
al. 2004). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308), agency theory is defined as “one 
in which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-
making authority to the agent”.  
As stated by Huse (2007) and Eisenhardt (1989), there are two main streams in 
agency theory, a positive stream and a normative stream. The positive stream fo-
cuses on the separation of ownership and control in large corporations. Here, the 
shareholders are the principal while the management is the agent (Huse, 2007; Ei-
senhardt, 1989). The normative stream is called the common agency theory, which 
considers all the principal-agent relationships. Here, the board members are con-
sidered as the agent for the owners as well as the principal for the management; 
other principals apart from shareholders may be included. Agency theory argues 
that boards should monitor the actions of agents (managers) on behalf of their prin-
cipals (shareholders) (Huse, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The relationship between the principal and the agent incorporates two major inter-
dependent problems. The first is the problem with information asymmetry between 
the principal and the agent and the second is the possibility of conflicts or diver-
gence of interest between the principal and the agent (Hill and Jones, 1992). In 
terms of divergence of interest, the agent does not necessarily make decisions in 
the best interest of the principal; rather, the agent (manager) prefers to purse his or 
her own personal objectives instead of the primary objective of wealth maximisa-
tion for shareholders. Managers display ‘egoism’ and engage in self-dealing activ-
ities which provide high short-run profit instead of engaging in long-term invest-
ment for the benefit of the shareholders (Boatright, 1999). Demirag and Tylecote 
(1992) argue that British companies engage in ‘short-termism’ which has the ten-
dency to foreshorten the time horizon applied to investment decisions; short-term 
activities by management create divergent objectives (see, for example, Eisen-
hardt, 1989). 
The agency problem arises because of three major assumptions. First, it is assumed 
that the principal and the agent may have different attitudes towards risk-bearing 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Second, the principal and the agent may essentially have dif-
ferent goals and interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). Third, both parties to the relationship 




goals or risk preferences were not too inherently different, all things being equal, 
there would be a reason to believe that a rational agent would not always act in the 
best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory is concerned with aligning the conflicting interests of principals 
and agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). It recommends that the prin-
cipal can limit divergences from his or her interests by establishing appropriate 
incentives or control mechanisms to limit the incidence of opportunistic action by 
the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
establishing these control mechanisms unavoidably generates three major costs: 
that is, firstly, the principal can expend resources to design a monitoring system 
(monitoring costs) which aims at reducing the behavioural activities of the agent. 
This may also include efforts on the part of the principal to control the behaviour 
of the agent through contractual agreements regarding budget restrictions, com-
pensation policies and operating rules (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Second, the principal may require the agent to spend resources (such as bonding 
costs) to guarantee that certain actions would not harm the principal. The agent 
may ex-ante incur bonding costs in order to win the right to manage the resources 
of the principal (Hill and Jones, 1992). Finally, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that, despite instituting monitoring and bonding mechanisms, that is, governance 
structures, there will still be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and 
those decisions which will maximise the welfare of the principal, which is defined 
as residual loss. The sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the agent’s 
bonding expenditures and any remaining residual loss is known as agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency costs can be reduced when the shareholders’ interests are aligned with the 
managers’ (agent) through the passing of shareholder resolutions; here, a group of 
shareholders collectively lobby on issues with which they are dissatisfied in order 
to align part of the agent’s interest (Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Hill and Jones, 
1992). Their collective lobbying helps them monitor and engage with the agent 
(see Hill and Jones, 1992).   
In reducing agency costs, the following steps should be taken. First, shareholders 
can organise one-to-one meetings between managers to help clarify issues of con-
cern. Such meetings can influence corporate behaviour in a very significant way 
(Holland, 1998). However, the Hampel Report (1998) suggested that institutional 
investors do not want to be involved in these meetings as they can create a lot of 
controversy and insider dealing where members can take advantage of private in-
formation to sell shares in a company on receipt of this information (Solomon and 
Solomon, 2004). 
Second, the board should invest in information systems in order to control agent 
opportunism. Information is regarded as a commodity; this means that it has a cost 
and can be purchased (Eisenhardt, 1989). Information comes in the form of budg-
eting, annual reports, directors and from management (Pearce et al. 1985; Ungson 
and Steers, 1984). When the board has adequate information on the firm, it helps 




Information is needed to monitor executive behaviours as it helps to know these 
behaviours. When the board provides richer information, it helps to determine the 
frequency of board meetings, the number of board subcommittees and the number 
of board members with managerial and industry experience. Top executives are 
more likely to engage in behaviours that are consistent with stockholders’ interests 
(Perrow 1986; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Third, the board should identify any systemic and non-systemic risks associated 
with the firm, as every organisation is assumed to have uncertainties in its business. 
The uncertainty comes in terms of risk/rewards trade-offs. Risk acceptance will 
influence the firm’s profitability, which should be accepted by the principal (Per-
row 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Fourth, shareholders can depend on regulation or formal guidance directing how 
managers should conduct themselves professionally to shareholders. Regulations 
help companies to become more accountable to their shareholders and other stake-
holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Solomon and Solomon 2004).   
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that agency problems are crucial to the contrac-
tual view of the firm, which can affect the principal’s writing complete contracts 
with the agent. Hart (1995) offers three reasons why the principal and agents tend 
to write incomplete contracts. First, it is difficult for people to think ahead and plan 
for any future contingencies. Second, negotiating effectively for a contract is very 
difficult, especially where one has prejudice and prior experience which will not 
help in making a fair decision (Hart, 1995; Wearing, 2005). Third, it is very diffi-
cult for any written contract to be made outside the court rules; the authority of the 
court is needed to interpret and enforce the contract when the need arises (Hart, 
1995; Wearing, 2005). Aghion and Bolton (1992) argue that, due to incomplete-
ness of the contract between the agent and the principal and wealth constraints, it 
is not possible to resolve all potential conflicts between the agent and the principal 
(Letza et al. 2004; Wearing 2005).  
Fifth, shareholders can also divest or sell their shares in a company in which they 
are not happy with the management. This action is seen as the ultimate decision 
shareholders will have to make because selling of their shares may affect their 
stake in the organisation and, in extreme cases, selling of their shares may affect 
market confidence and share prices, especially when they hold a huge investment 
in the firm (Solomon and Solomon, 2004).  
Finally, Jensen and Ruback (1983) reiterate that shareholders can discipline man-
agement using the stock market through the takeover mechanism; that is, if share-
holders are not satisfied with management structures, they can vote in favour of a 
takeover bid. The threat of takeover becomes a disciplining force on managers, as 
they cannot stand to lose their jobs (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). In summary, 
managers’ and shareholders’ interests should always align in order to minimise 





2.2.4 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory is different from agency theory, information asymmetry and 
signalling theories that place much emphasis on managerial opportunism and mon-
itoring (Davis et al. 1997). It posits that executive managers are reliable and trust-
worthy individuals and that they should be empowered to run firms because they 
are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; 
Letza et al. 2004; Davis et al. 1997). Stewardship theory makes some assumptions 
about the behaviour of senior managers. First, it assumes that the behaviours of the 
executives are aligned with the interest of the principals (Davis et al. 1997). The 
second assumption is that the organisational structure is designed so that managers 
can take effective actions and enhance shareholder returns (Donaldson and Davis, 
1994). 
Third, it assumes that, since top managers spend their entire working lives in the 
company they run, they are more likely to understand the business than outside 
directors and thus can make superior decisions (ibid). Fourth, executive managers 
possess superior formal and informal information about the firm they manage, 
which can aid better decision-making (ibid). Finally, competitive internal and ex-
ternal market disciplines and the fear of damaging their future managerial capital 
ensure that agency costs are minimised (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). As 
a result of this, proponents of stewardship theory contend that better financial per-
formance is likely to be associated with internal corporate governance practices 
that grant managers greater powers, such as combining the positions of company 
chair and CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 1994). Managers now have a choice 
whether to behave as stewards or as agents, so that they can provide shareholders 
with a framework of psychological and situational factors based on the choice they 
make (Davis et al. 1997; Ntim, 2009). 
2.2.5 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory suggests that the implementation of internal corpo-
rate governance structures, such as a board of directors, is not only necessary for 
ensuring that managers are effectively monitored, but also serves as an important 
link between the firm and the critical resources that it needs to maximise financial 
performance (Pfeffer, 1978). First, the board and non-executive directors can offer 
essential resources such as expert advice, experience, independent suggestions and 
knowledge to the principal (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Second, they can bring 
reputation and critical business contacts to the firm (ibid). Third, the board can 
facilitate access to business/political elite information and capital to the company 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). Finally, the board can provide a critical link to a firm’s 
external environment and stakeholders such as government, suppliers and compet-




links to the external environment are associated with better access to resources, 
which can have a positive impact on companies’ financial performance17. 
Resource dependence theory suggests that the presence of gender balance on a 
board committee improves decision-making and helps align the organisation with 
its external environment and resources, thereby enhancing the firm’s financial per-
formance. These benefits occur because women are able to bring to the board dif-
ferent attributes, experiences and ideals that lead to a better appreciation of busi-
ness complexities, which eventually improves the firm’s corporate governance 
quality (Carter et al. 2003). Section 2.2.6 discusses the group effectiveness and 
diversity theories. 
2.2.6 Group Effectiveness and Diversity Theories 
Group effectiveness and diversity theories suggest that people with common inter-
ests interact and work together. Overall, the theory implies that people with com-
plementary backgrounds such as education, skills and talent commit themselves to 
a common goal for the firm (Ruigrok et al. 2006). The group could be made up of 
people of different genders, cultures, ethnicity and geographical diversity working 
together to maximise shareholders’ wealth (ibid). This means that all members of 
the group are mutually accountable to each other. When the group members are 
accountable to each other, it brings collaboration and efficiency to the organisa-
tion. 
According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), a diverse board benefits from strategic 
decision-making and increased creativity due to the presence of different cognitive 
abilities among board members. Every firm should consider appropriate skills, tal-
ent and educational background when recruiting new staff. Their skills should al-
ways complement and enable them to collaborate with other members of the group 
in order to achieve the long-term objectives of the firm (Ruigrok et al. 2006). 
The establishment of different board committees such as audit, remuneration and 
nomination committee and the presence of gender diversity among UK financial 
institutions are to complement each other in the firm’s strategic decision-making. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter gives a detailed definition of corporate governance mechanisms 
which exist in the UK and other parts of the world. It can be argued that there is 
no universally accepted corporate governance definition even though most authors 
                                                 
17 Pfeffer (1978) introduced the notion that environments are the source of scarce resources and organisa-
tions are dependent on these finite resources for survival. A lack of control over these resources eventually 
creates uncertainty for firms operating in that environment. He suggested that organisations must develop 





normally cite the Cadbury Report (1992). However, this study will rely on both 
the Cadbury Report and Sheikh and Chatterjee’s (1995) corporate governance def-
inition to support this research theme. 
The UK’s corporate governance follows the Anglo-American model where firms 
exist primarily to maximise shareholders’ interest and rely on a single or unitary 
board for the decision-making process. The formation of the unitary board can be 
based on the needs and direction of the firm. For the purpose of this research, em-
phasis will be placed on the establishment of audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees within the unitary board and how the presence of women on the unitary 
board can impact the firm’s financial value (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1997; Berle 
and Means, 1932).  
This chapter discusses other theories used in supporting the empirical research and 
its functions to the firm. These theories can be summarised as follows. The stake-
holder model has shown that firms exist to satisfy both the internal and external 
systems such as employees, creditors, debtors, regulatory systems, and political 
and economic institutions within which firms operate (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
1997; Berle and Means, 1932).  
Agency costs can be curtailed when shareholders’ interest is aligned with man-
ager/agent’s (Blair, 1995). Stewardship theory is contrary to agency theory; it 
states that executive managers are reliable and trustworthy individuals and that 
they should be empowered to run firms because they are good stewards of the 
resources entrusted to them (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Letza et al. 2004; Davis et 
al. 1997). Resource dependence theory suggests that the implementation of inter-
nal corporate governance structures, such as a board of directors, is not only nec-
essary for ensuring that managers are effectively monitored, but also serves as an 
important link between the firm and the critical resources that it needs to maximise 
financial performance (Pfeffer, 1978). Also, group effectiveness and diversity the-
ories suggest that people with common interests interact and work together 
(Ruigrok et al. 2006). These theories will give a better understanding of the re-
search purpose and why it should be addressed empirically.  
The theories also offer a review of the existing theoretical literature that tries to 
link corporate governance structures such as board committees, gender diversity 
and firm financial performance. These theories trace the corporate governance-
financial performance relationship literature and develop the hypotheses among 
the variables examined. The theories will help predict the research situation and 





3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with corporate governance and the global financial crisis that 
took place during the 2007/08 period. One of the objectives of the thesis is to ex-
amine if the 2007/08 global financial crisis influenced firm financial performance. 
The next objective of this research is to examine if the establishment of board 
committees and the appointment of females (Board Gender Diversity) onto the 
corporate boards of UK financial institutions can improve a firm’s value. This sec-
tion will give an explanation of exactly what happened during the crisis era. The 
causes of the financial crises are discussed below. 
3.2 The Global Financial Crisis and its Causes 
The global financial crisis or credit crunch which ran from 2007/08 shook the en-
tire financial sector and affected the UK economy. Similar crises have also taken 
place before this global crisis. For example, the Great Depression of 1930, the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the economic recession in 2001.  
Since financial institutions in the UK have been operating before and after the 
2007/08 crisis, my research will ascertain if a firm’s financial performance prior to 
the crisis and after the crisis is related to the establishment of its board committees. 
The 2007/08 financial crisis started due to the collapse of the real estate market  
in 2006 in the US when subprime mortgages were the first symptom of a credit 
boom that turned to bust and of a real estate shock18 (Mizen, 2008). The subprime 
mortgages were an innovation of the 1990s, stimulated by laws, financial deregu-
lation and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which gave incentives to 
lenders to extend loans to individuals with low income and limited or outright poor 
credit histories (Wallison 2009; Fratianni et al. 2009). Banks had to show that they 
were meeting the objectives of the act by making a certain number of loans to 
people with low or moderate income (Fratianni et al. 2009). Credit evaluations 
were replaced by more flexible procedures that justified lending to the target cli-
entele (Fratianni et al. 2009). According to Wallison (2009), two government-
                                                 
18 The subprime market basically means below the standard set. A subprime mortgage is a mortgage given 
out to borrowers with lower income and lower credit rating. Institutions have to charge very high interest 
rates to compensate for the risk. This offered the opportunity for some borrowers to be given a loan that 
they had no hope of repaying, and the problem arose when more people failed to pay back their mortgages 
than the banks had anticipated. Eventually, the borrowers defaulted on their payment and this led to the 




sponsored intermediary agencies, Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Mortgage Corporation), were entrusted 
with the mission to supply the USA housing market with cheaper housing. These 
two agencies were under pressure from the US government to increase lending to 
minorities and low-income homebuyers. Government policy over many years 
caused this problem, as they enforced the reduced lending standards that were es-
sential to the growth in home ownership and the housing bubble (Wallison, 2009). 
As at 1979-1985, the demand for credit was very high in the US as compared to 
the demand for money; that is, 11.34% demanded money while 38.47% demanded 
credit. This is because, the better credit one has, the easier it is to gain access to 
loans, mortgages and other credit cards (Bernanke et al. 1988).   
By 1997, Fannie was offering a 97% loan-to-value mortgage; by 2001, it was offer-
ing mortgages with no down payment at all. By 2007, Fannie and Freddie were re-
quired to show that 55% of their mortgage purchases were LMI (low-to-moderate 
income) loans and, within those goals, 38% of all purchases were to come from 
underserved areas and 25% were to be loans to low-income and very low-income 
borrowers. Meeting these goals required them to purchase loans with low down pay-
ment and other deficiencies that would mark them as subprime (Wallison, 2009). 
According to Heilpern et al. (2009), $2 trillion out of $11 trillion outstanding mort-
gages in 2007 were subprime. Efforts to reduce mortgage-lending standards were 
led again by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Wallison, 2009).  
However, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had a mortgage ceiling of around 
$200,000. This meant that they could not borrow more than this threshold, so the 
banks and other mortgage agencies moved in to fill the gap. At the same time, 
banks and other lenders were finding it not useful to look to prime borrowers with 
large amounts of equity in their homes, secure jobs and rising incomes. Such bor-
rowers were demanding the finest rates in a highly competitive marketplace and 
organising their existing home loans so that they could benefit from the record low 
interest rate. The prime market was losing its allure, making real estate agents, 
mortgage brokers and bankers turn their sights on the millions of people with less 
collateral and lower incomes who were yearning to climb the housing ladder. Bor-
rowers were able to reach through the invention of subprime loans; house builders 
and construction firms were able to cater for the boom by building millions of 
cheap homes. This gave people with no prospect of fulfilling the ‘American 
Dream’ a chance to own their own homes (Brummer et al. 2007)19.  
                                                 
19 The introduction of the CRA and the use of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase the housing market 
for minorities and low-income homebuyers led to excessive promotion of house ownership without adequate 
and sufficient regulation in the financial sector, which resulted in increased credit, bad loans and increased 
speculation in the housing market. The bubbles in housing prices dragged down the banks and the economy 
in the US, which eventually spread to other parts of the world because of globalisation in the banking sector. 
Secondly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac used their affordable housing mission to avoid additional regulation 
by Congress during the government sponsored enterprise (GSE) in order to increase their support for afford-
able housing on accumulation of mortgage portfolios. Between 2005 and 2007, Fannie and Freddie brought 
approximately $1 trillion in subprime or Alt-A mortgages, which is estimated to be $2 trillion, which also 





The next section will highlight some of the factors that contributed to the global 
financial crisis of 2007/2008.  
3.2.1 Global Imbalance and Interest Rates 
Global imbalances started with the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when most coun-
tries borrowed too much in foreign currency and had difficulties in repaying it. The 
IMF then asked various governments to raise interest rates and cut government 
spending (Allen and Carletti, 2010). 
Money kept too long in the aftermath of the 2001 recession is said to have fuelled 
the credit bubble (Bustillo and Velloso, 2009). During 2002 and 2003, when Japan 
experienced deflation, the Federal Reserve cut the Federal Funds rate to 1% for a 
year. Interest rates were raised between 2004 and 2006 in a more gradual way. The 
gradual tightening process encouraged broad risk-taking behaviour and made most 
countries link their currencies to the dollar (Allen and Carletti, 2010; Mallaby, 
2008). 
However, Mallaby (2008) argues that “the credit bubble has its origins in a two-
headed monetary order, where some countries allow their currencies to float, while 
others peg their currency closely to the dollar’’. For example, China pegged their 
currency against the dollar for five years, making their currency very cheap for ex-
porters (Mallaby, 2008). Cheap exports from China created huge trade surpluses 
which were later pumped back through the purchase of US assets, (mortgage) inflat-
ing a credit bubble. This also created a huge capital flood in the US market. The 
flood of capital fuelled the financial boom by pushing interest rates down (Mallaby, 
2008). As interest rates fall or home prices rise (cash-out financing) to a point at 
which home owners can make some equity, they then treat their homes as savings, 
drawing out funds to buy cars, boats and second homes (Wallison, 2009). 
According to Wallison (2009), 86% of homeowners cashed out a total amount of 
$327 billion in 2006, which means that there was not enough equity to support the 
mortgage market when prices fell or in times of uncertainty. 
3.2.2 Regulation and Supervision 
The deregulatory factor in the US is often cited as one of the causes of the financial 
crisis. Another school of thought also argued that the failure to regulate new finan-
cial instruments was the result of the crisis. The passage of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Services Modernisation Act in 1999 repealed part of the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, opening up competition among banks, securities, insurance 
companies and many others. Basically, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibited a bank 
from offering investment, commercial banking and insurance services. This new 
law let commercial banks, security firms and insurers offer an array of financial 




For example, the SEC oversees the brokerage of companies. Bank regulators over-
see supervision of bank operations and the state insurance commission oversees 
the insurance business. No single agency had authority over an entire company 
(Bustillo and Velloso, 2009). As argued by Stiglitz (2009), the repeal of Glass-
Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, which caused the de-
mand for high returns, which are obtained through high leverage and big risk-tak-
ing. Failure by government agencies to regulate innovated financial instruments, 
as well as risk management, left room for companies to take ‘excessive risk and 
asset price inflation’; even where financial institutions are regulated, they still get 
around it (Bustillo and Velloso, 2009). 
Also, banking regulatory policy introduced in 1988 and known as Basel, ensures 
that banks are adequately capitalised. “Banks assets are assigned to different risk 
categories and the amount of capital that a bank holds for each asset is pegged to 
the asset’s perceived riskiness” (Wallison, 2009). This means that AAA asset-
backed securities are less than half as risky as commercial loans. These rules pro-
vided an “incentive for banks to hold mortgages in preference to commercial loans 
or converting portfolios of whole mortgages into mortgages-backed securities 
(MBS) portfolio rated. This substantially reduces their capital requirements” 
(ibid). The prime mortgage is often high loan-to-value ratios or other indicators of 
low quality. The Basel regulation encouraged commercial banks to hold only a 
small amount of capital against the risk associated with residential mortgages and, 
as the risk increased because of inadequate lending coupled with a ballooning of 
home prices, the Basel capital became increasingly insufficient for the risks to 
banks holding mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (Wallison, 2009) 20. 
In addition to that, credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody and 
Fitch Ratings badly misjudged the risks associated with mortgage-based securities. 
The rating agencies paid attention to the revenue paid by issuers rather than inves-
tors and had a large fraction of their revenues originating from rating financial 
products with complex structures (Bustillo and Velloso, 2009). “As rating agen-
cies began to receive a large proportion of their income from rating products, they 
lost their objectivity and started giving ratings that weren’t justified” (Allen and 
Carletti, 2010). 
3.2.3 Securitisation – Structured Finance 
Securitisation of assets is the process which involves repackaging and selling-off bal-
ance sheet assets like mortgages into a secondary market for investors. Structured 
finance comes from banking and financial innovation aimed at transferring credit risk 
from individual financial institutions to the market as a whole (Wallison, 2009). 
                                                 
20 For example, “the Basel accord requires banks to set capital aside against contingencies in order to 
avoid defaults, banks looked for ways around the rules by shifting assets off their balance-sheets through 
securitization structured investment vehicles and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) to cut the risk of borrowers 
defaulting”. When the market unravelled, these assets threatened to come back onto the balance-sheets 




This mortgage-backed securitisation helped the banks to modify their balance 
sheets, and risk exposure and cost of capital by raising extra cash resources to en-
able them to lend to households. Securitisation provided banks with the financial 
support to increase the supply of mortgage funds to many homeowners (Heilpern 
et al. 2009). The mortgage-backed securities were sold to investors that had differ-
ent appetites for risk, so the subprime mortgage debt was mixed with AAA-rated 
mortgages and well packaged for investors. The mortgage loans were sometimes 
turned into a bond for investors to buy and a credit agency will have used obscure 
alchemy to bless the bond with a triple-A rating, making it appear very good to 
investors to buy (Wallison, 2009). This provided a good portfolio diversification 
for investors and also improved liquidity for the banks (Heilpern et al. 2009). 
Some of the loans were also packaged as Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and 
Commercial Papers (CP) or transferred as sponsored Structured Investment Vehi-
cle (SIV). This SIV in turn packages the loans into residential MBS or CP which 
will receive a credit risk score by rating agencies. The SIV obtains funding by 
borrowing short term in the commercial paper market and from banks. If the SIV 
is unable to refinance itself, it can count on contingency support from its sponsor-
ing banks (Fratianni et al. 2009). It was estimated that a total of $1,800 billion of 
SIVs and commercial paper was held by banks in 2007 (IMF 2008). 
However, there was a problem with the structured finance; that is, the originator 
or the bank did not conform to standards of disclosure and also the product was 
too complex for rating agencies to properly evaluate (Fratianni et al. 2009). This 
type of loan became the second main issue that caused the credit crunch because 
investors all over the world purchased these corporate bonds; these subprime loans 
were often amalgamated into mortgage-backed securities, which were then sold to 
financial institutions across the world and eventually found their way into compa-
nies (Brummer et al. 2007). This loan was absolutely safe because they had the 
backing of the US Federal Government.21 
                                                 
21 Between 1996 and 200,7 mortgage-backed securities accounted for three-quarters of the annual US se-
curitisation market (Heilpern et al., 2009 p.113). According to Geradi et al. (2006), two regulatory adjust-
ments were introduced which promoted the growth of securitisation; that is, the modification of accounting 
regulation which was introduced by the Federal Home Loan Board (FHLBB) in October 1981, and the 
Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) in which the under-listed companies (Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac) were exempted from state investor protection laws. 
Securitisation also became very popular in the United States when the government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae) securitised mortgages composed of Federal Housing Administration and Veter-
ans Administration (FHA/VA) mortgages backed by the US government for resale in a secondary market 
in 1968 (Mizen, 2008). In 1981, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) began to issue 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) and afterwards the new, private securitised products were started for 
prime loans without the backing of the government (Mizen, 2008). There also emerged the European Asset 
Securitisation in the 1990s, which was picked up in 2004 in the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. It was less 
popular in Germany, France and Portugal (Mizen, 2008). According to Mizen (2008), more than half of the 
on securitisation was sold outside the European area, with one-third sold to institutions in the UK between 
2005 to 2006 by commercial and investment banks through the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) which 
were created for that purpose (Gorton and Souleles 2005). After the securitisation was introduced, a new 
market for Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) consisting of Asset-Backed Securities emerged. The 
CDOs had claims of different seniority which offered different payments (Mizen, 2008; Chomsisengphet 





3.2.4 Bankers’ Position 
The fourth factor that caused the crisis was the incentive systems available for the 
bankers (Wallison, 2009). Banks also made a lot of money through mortgage fees, 
commissions and bonuses by setting up new loan businesses. The underwriting 
rules in banks were thrown out and some of the loans required low documentation 
or no documentation, and some even needed no proof of income or credit history22 
(Brummer et al. 2007). The use of brokers and agents on commission which was 
driven by ‘quantity’ not ‘quality’ added to the problem; brokers also fraudulently 
reported information to ensure a mortgage arrangement had occurred; they did not 
care so much about their reputation (Mizen, 2008). Finally, excessive compensa-
tions given to bankers and managers in the financial sectors made them take ex-
cessive risks with investors’ money. Larger compensation is always tied to short-
term profits, which makes the bankers take big incentives to take larger risks than 
are warranted by the goal of maximising shareholders’ profits (Bustillo and Vel-
loso, 2009). 
3.2.5 Lack of Liquidity 
The fifth reason is that when the bust occurred most companies especially financial 
institutions were affected by liquidity. The Asset-Backed Commercial paper 
started facing liquidity risks, institutions started switching from commercial paper 
to government securities, causing Treasury yields to decline. Banks also refused 
to lend to each other due to a lack of commitment to Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper (ABCP) structures. This made countries inject liquidity into the economy. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) injected €95 billion of liquidity into the Euro 
zone (Mizen, 2008). 
The US also injected $24 billion into the market; later on, the government subse-
quently injected $700 billion, which was known as the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP), in a form of preferred stock to banks and car manufacturing com-
panies such as General Motors and Chrysler, and insurer AIG had $70 billion, 
Bank of America $45 billion and Citigroup $45 billion and $5 billion in support of 
loan guarantee23. 
The UK government also injected £50 billion, which was used to buy stakes or 
shares in the banks that were greatly affected by the crunch such as Northern Rock, 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB. The government also promised 
                                                 
22 According to Crotty (2008), “banks and mortgage brokers pushed the mortgage sales because they 
earned fees in proportion of the volumes they wrote”. They also earned large fees by selling the mortgage 
on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) in the form of securitisa-
tions. The mortgage was given a high AAA rating by credit agencies in order for it to look very attractive 
to buy. 
23 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/04/business/20110804-bailout-totals-graphic.html?scp=1&sq= 





£250 billion to help banks refinance debt; the central Bank of England also agreed 
to double its lending to £200 billion in a special liquidity scheme24. 
3.3 Aftermaths of the Financial Crisis in the UK 
The financial crisis brought about instability in the financial sector, which was 
enjoying efficient, stable and fair financial markets. The instability affected the 
wider economy, allocation of capital within countries, and left individuals and 
business unable to access savings or to raise finance. The government then created 
a ‘memorandum of understanding’ between HM Treasury, the Bank of England 
(BoE) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) which was complemented by 
the Financial Ombudsman Service and the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS) in order to provide customers with the right to redress and com-
pensation. This instability made the government to undertake certain actions such 
as strengthening the stability and resilience of the financial systems in the UK and 
globally; reducing the chance of individual banks facing difficulties; providing 
compensation and creating confidence for consumers; and strengthening the BoE 
and ensure they coordinate with other agencies such as FCA and HM Treasury. 
Apart from relaxation in regulation during the crisis, securitisation also brought 
financial instability into the UK economy at this time. This is where loans pur-
chased and other assets were then packaged and sold to investors and other banks. 
The credit rating agencies also created a lot of challenges in the systems where 
information they provided did not reflect the full picture on the ground.  
The BoE provided liquidity assistance to assist banks such as Northern Rock, RBS, 
Lloyds TSB and Dunfermline Building Society, among others, who were having 
liquidity problems during the period of financial instability. This meant that the 
FCA had to come up with a proposal which could make companies disclose their 
company information. The FCA agreed to scrutinise banks and communicate this 
information to customers.25 
The next section will deal with government regulating policies introduced during 
the financial crisis. 
3.4 Government Regulating Policies 
The UK currently has a tripartite financial regulatory body which comprises the 
Bank of England (BoE), the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and HM Treasury 
(the Treasury), which are collectively responsible for financial stability. After the 
financial crisis, there were deficiencies in the UK’s regulatory systems because of 
                                                 
24 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/3155514/Financial-crisis-50billion-bank-
rescue-package-to-be-announced.html. Accessed on 08/08/12. 
25 The Aftermaths of the financial crisis in the UK information is retrieved from Financial Instability Report, 




government intervention preventing RBS, Bradford & Bingley Building Society, 
Dunfermline Building Society, Northern Rock and Lloyds TSB from collapsing. 
This brought about serious deficiencies in the UK’s regulatory systems, where the 
monolithic financial regulators, the FCA, were accused of having insufficient fo-
cus to identify and tackle issues early. “The FCA identified serious shortcoming in 
its supervision of Northern Rock prior to their failure in 2007” (HM Treasury 
2017). The BoE did not have the tools to fulfil its responsibility. The Treasury also 
did not have a clear responsibility for dealing with a crisis, which means that no 
single institution had the full responsibility or authority to monitor the systems, 
identify the risks to financial stability and act decisively to tackle them. The new 
regulatory structure will reduce the systematic risks that financial services pose 
and ensure that economically advantageous activity is not driven away by inappro-
priate regulation (HM Treasury 2017; BoE 2017).   
Also, the government agreed to create a New Prudential Regulation Authority 
(PRA) which will be responsible for the day-to-day supervision of financial insti-
tutions. The establishment of the New Consumer Protection and Markets Authority 
(CPMA) was also another policy agenda created by the government to help regu-
late the conduct of all financial service firms. The government also created a New 
Economic Crime Agency (NECA) which will bring together various government 
agencies into a single force to help tackle financial crime. The policy also includes 
setting up an Independent Commission on Banking in order to investigate the 
structure and competition of UK banks. Helping small- and medium-size busi-
nesses (SME) to access finance was also one of the policies created by the govern-
ment. Finally, the policy brought about the introduction of a banking levy so that 
banks may have fair contributions in terms of risk26. Below is a description of the 
new financial service regulators and their functions (HM Treasury, 2017; BoE, 
2017).   
The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was established as a committee of the BoE, 
responsible for macro-prudential regulation which involves macro-issues that af-
fect economic and financial stability. It will also have the power to address the 
risks, requiring the PRA to implement its decisions by taking action concerning 
any firm. Cooperation will exist between the FPC, the PRA and the CPMA in order 
to ensure that the FPC is kept fully informed on any issues that might affect finan-
cial stability. The FPC will be accountable to the BoE Court of Directors, which 
will review FPC procedures, and also to Parliament, as it will be required to publish 
biannual financial stability reports, which will be scrutinised by the Treasury Se-
lect Committee (HM Treasury, 2017; BoE, 2017).   
                                                 
26 The financial crisis has given the government good reason to review financial services regulation and the 
introduction of new reforms. The government introduced the financial Services Regulation bill in order to 
reform the regulatory framework, where the government agreed to transfer the control of macro prudential 
regulation and oversight of micro prudential regulation from the FSA to the BoE. The reason for govern-
ment action is the belief that only central banks have the required authority, knowledge and understanding 
of macroeconomics and markets to make macro prudential judgements. Since the financial crisis reiterated 
that central bank’s is the lender of last resort, it means they need to familiarity with every aspect of the 
institutions that they may need to support. The government then establish the following bodies to undertake 




The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) will be established as a subsidiary of 
the BoE. It will be responsible for the micro-prudential regulation of financial in-
stitutions, including retail and investment banks, building societies, broker-dealers 
and insurance companies. The PRA will strengthen the financial systems and 
maintain its resilience to any future crisis. It will also be responsible for the au-
thorisation, regulation and supervision of all firms subjected to prudential regula-
tion. The government will consider any modification or alternatives to the financial 
services and Markets Act (FSMA 2000) that are required to accomplish this ob-
jective. The PRA will be accountable to the BoE Court of Directors and account-
able to Parliament (HM Treasury 2017; BoE 2017).   
The Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA) will take on the FCA’s 
responsibility for consumer protection and become a single conduct regulator, re-
sponsible for the Financial Ombudsman Service, the Consumer Financial Educa-
tion Body, consumer credit and the Financial Service Compensation Scheme. It 
will also be responsible for the conduct of all firms, retail and wholesale, in their 
dealings with consumers. The CPMA is a strong consumer champion and promotes 
confidence in financial services and markets (HM Treasury, 2017; BoE, 2017).   
The Serious Economics Crimes Agency (SECA) will take over the work of the 
FCA, the Serious Fraud Office and the Office of Fair Trading in handling serious 
economic crime.27  
The next section deals with the Independent Commission on Banking created as 
part of government regulation policies. 
3.5 Independent Commission on Banking 
The Independent Commission on Banking (the Commission) was established by 
the government in June 2010 to examine the structure of the UK banking sector. 
The Commission aims to make banks more resilient to shocks by requiring them 
to hold more capital relative to their lending activity and more access to liquidity.  
The Basel Committee on Banking also proposed major changes to bank capital and 
liquidity requirements and related regulatory changes. The Independent Commis-
sion on Banking highlighted issues which affected financial instability, as detailed 
below. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) set out banking capital re-
quirements for all banks to adopt in order to ensure that there is continuous liquid-
ity in the banking system. Following the financial crisis, the BCBS announced the 
strengthening of capital requirements to remedy the deficiencies since most banks 
did not hold enough cash against risk exposures. The Basel III changes will in-
crease the quality of capital by placing greater emphasis on its capacity to absorb 
losses. The capital will also increase on certain asset classes such as trading book 
                                                 
27 Government additional reform policy information was taken from the HM Treasury websites and BoE 




assets and securitisation. This will make banks retain capital above minimum re-
quirements and will increase their resilience to shocks; the implementation time 
for Basel III has been extended to the end of 201828(ICB, 2010, p. 58). Institutions 
that failed during the crisis did so mainly due to liquidity problems; Basel III aims 
to improve liquidity risk management by requiring banks to establish a liquidity 
risk tolerance level, developing contingency fund plans and senior management 
oversight of liquidity risk. The FCA also introduced the liquidity regime to imple-
ment the BCBS29 (ICB, 2010). 
The crisis raised concerns that the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in 
the US and other countries were inadequate. This allowed the drive to converge 
with the principles-based International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)30 
(ICB, 2010). The weaknesses in the capital and accounting framework meant that 
bank employees were “remunerated on the basis of reported profits that were nei-
ther time-nor risk-adjusted” (ICB, 2010) and led to incentives that were not always 
aligned with the long-term interests of the bank. The FCA introduced a remunera-
tion Code in order to promote effective risk management such as salary, bonus, 
cash and shares31 (ibid). “The increasing systemic importance of hedge funds has 
made authorities to review the regulatory requirements placed on managers” 
(ICB, 2010). The proposed new directive on Alternative Investment Fund Manag-
ers (AIFMs) regulated depositors and administrators in terms of minimum capital 
requirement concerning portfolio size, governance and risk management, which 
will enhance transparency for investors and supervisors (ICB, 2010). 
The increase in derivatives for speculative purposes, particularly OTC (over the 
counter), during the financial crisis allocated risk across the financial system. OTC 
derivative transactions are reported to a trade repository which collates and dis-
tributes information to regulators and the market. The EU proposed restrictions on 
speculative trading which include a ban on credit default swaps (CDI) and disclo-
sure of short positions (ICB, 2010). 
Supervisory authorities have been encouraged to coordinate, share information and 
manage capital requirements among member countries. The EU established three 
new authorities to oversee banking, securities and markets, insurance and pen-
sions, and the European Systemic Risk Board. The UK introduced the New Pru-
dential Regulatory Authority, the Financial Policy Committee as a subsidiary of 
the BoE and the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority responsible for busi-
ness regulation, market supervision and consumer protection (ICB, 2010). 
A new tax code of 50% on bonuses over £25,000 paid to banking staff was intro-
duced in December 2009. A new banking levy was established in order to encour-
age banks to move to less risky investment in which the tax code is calculated with 
reference to the firm’s liabilities (ICB, 2010).  
                                                 
28 Independent Commission on Banking information is retrieved and accessed on June 2017 p. 58. 
29 Independent Commission on Banking information is retrieved and accessed on June 2017 p. 58. 
30 Independent Commission on Banking information is retrieved and accessed on June 2017 pp 59 




The next section provides the conclusion to the chapter. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights some of the causes of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis 
in the UK and other parts of the world. The financial crisis was a result of global 
imbalance, regulation and supervision, securitisation, bankers’ position and lack 
of liquidity. Based on the factors discussed, we can argue that the crisis was a result 
of negligence emanating from all stakeholders.  
After the crisis in the UK, banks and other financial institutions were rescued or 
bailed out by the government with taxpayers’ money to prevent them from col-
lapsing. If the government had not rescued these banks, their failure could have 
caused unacceptable disruption to the overall financial system which would have 
been difficult to contain. 
Apart from the government rescuing these banks from collapsing, the deficiencies 
in the financial system were addressed through the establishment of government 
regulating policies such as the new Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which 
is responsible for the day-to-day supervision of financial institutions; the New 
Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA), which is responsible for 
consumer protection; the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), which is responsible 
for macro-prudential regulation which involves macro-issues that affect economic 
and financial stability; the Serious Economic Crimes Agency, which is responsible 
for handling serious economic crime; and, finally, the Independent Commission 
on Banking, which is responsible for examining the structure in the banking sector 
such as accounting reporting procedures, bonuses, OTC trading, etc. (HM Treas-
ury, 2017; BoE, 2017).   
Additionally, the deficiencies in the financial sector as a result of the crisis were 
not only handled through government regulation policies but also through various 
corporate governance reforms and the need for firms to have board committees 
(audit, remuneration and nomination) in place to ensure that important decisions 
were properly securitised and checked thoroughly in order to prevent any future 
negligence. Also, the reforms helped to cover any overlaps in corporate govern-
ance policies and avoid future market failures in UK financial institutions (Walker 
Review, 2009; FRC 2014 and 2016). One motivation for this research is to exam-
ine if the establishment of these board committees and the presence of women 
influenced UK financial firms’ return on asset (ROA) and market or firm value 









4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 The Financial Services Industry in the UK 
The financial services industry in the UK is seen as the world-leading hub for 
this industry, after the US. The sector offers services such as banking, insurance, 
mortgage, asset management and mutual funds to all stakeholders (BoE, 2013 
and HM Treasury, 2013). These services create corporate and income tax for the 
government, returns on investors (shareholders) and employment for the citizens. 
Services and products offered by the financial services industry are discussed 
below. 
Banks are seen as places where individuals and businesses deposit their money and 
assets, transfer money from one person or company to another, invest in govern-
ment bonds, apply for loans and letters of credit, and ensure that funds ‘pass hands’ 
in a legal and structured manner. The banks are the largest segment in the UK 
financial services industry, which employs over 400,000 members of staff. A bank 
which is resilient, fair to customers and serves the wider economy is of importance 
to the nation’s development (BoE, 2013; HM Treasury, 2013). 
The insurance industry has been established to provide guarantees of compensa-
tion for any loss, damage or death in return for the payment of a premium. The 
insurance industry employs over 300,000 people and forms 25% of total net worth 
in the UK. The UK insurance industry is the largest in Europe and the third largest 
in the world (BoE, 2015; HM Treasury, 2015). The UK is the largest centre for 
asset management in Europe with £4 trillion of assets under management. Asset 
management normally refers to investment such as stocks, bonds and real estate. 
The sector employs 24,000 workers (BoE, 2015; HM Treasury, 2013).  
Furthermore, the mutual fund is also a collection of equity from investors with the 
purpose of investing in securities such as stocks, bonds and money market instru-
ments. Examples of mutual fund are unit trust, open-ended investment trust 
(OEIC), mutual insurers, cooperatives and credit unions32.  
                                                 
32 Information on Introduction to the Financial Services Industry in the UK was taken from the HM 
Treasury websites on the 19th June 2013. 32 The deficiencies in the financial system during the financial 
crisis led to the establishment of the Financial Policy Committees (FPCs) and Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) by the Bank of England (BoE) to help regulate the financial industry. The Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) was given more powers and changed its name to the Financial Conduct Au-




Additionally, the mortgage industry is also another financial service sector in the 
UK. A mortgage is a loan secured to buy a house or property and paid in instal-
ments over a set period of time, with a promise that money borrowed will be repaid 
(HM Treasury, 2013). The financial crisis in 2007 started as a result of the way 
and manner in which the mortgage industry was handled during that time. Due to 
government support of the mortgage industry, Lloyds Banking Group and RBS 
were asked by the government in 2010 to lend £3bn and £8bn respectively (BoE, 
2013; HM Treasury, 2013).  
The authorities governing UK financial institutions are made up of tripartite regu-
lators, the Bank of England, HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority 
(BoE, 2013; HM Treasury, 2013 and FCA, 2013), whose job is to see to it that the 
financial institutions enjoy a level of stability, growth and transparency to stake-
holders. Apart from these three regulators, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) reg-
ulates companies that want to be listed on the stock market in order to generate 
external funds from investors. LSE requirements include compliance with all UK 
corporate governance codes. The UK government revises and amends corporate 
governance policies on a continuous basis, in order to address any issues (BoE, 
2013; HM Treasury, 2013 and FCA, 2013). The next subsection discusses corpo-
rate governance in banks and financial institutions. 
4.2 Corporate Governance in Banks and Financial Institutions 
The financial crisis prompted researchers and stakeholders to examine banks and 
other financial institutions’ activities closely. Modern economies need a well-func-
tioning financial system, which means that any flaws in the financial institutions 
greatly impact the economy (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012). Corporate govern-
ance of banks and other financial institutions differs from other sectors of the econ-
omy. It goes beyond shareholders (equity governance) to include employees, di-
rectors, creditors, debtors and the government, (Hopt, 2013; Mehran and Mol-
lineaux, 2012). The sector is also very complex to control and manage as it requires 
adequate knowledge and experience from decision-makers. The board of directors 
in every financial institution needs to understand all complex financial products, 
risks to the company and their controls. Any failure of responsibility on the part of 
management and the board of directors will have consequences on the firm’s cor-
porate governance (Hopt, 2013). 
Financial institutions are governed by laws, regulations and informal rules such as 
social values, norms and government tax code. These same laws and regulations 
can serve as financial instruments that can become a weapon of mass financial 
destruction or can create an economy-wide bubble. The laws and regulations can 
also create an incentive for the failure of the management of financial institutions, 
their owners, creditors and debtors (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). 
Any decision by the banks and other financial institutions is influenced by internal 




such as market participants33, regulators and legislators also influence the firm’s 
actions (OECD, 2009; Basel Committee, 1999; Levine, 2011). The interests of 
these groups are not equal and do not always align because each wants a different 
outcome or risk profile for financial institutions. Regulators also face different in-
centives as to how they intervene in the markets in the interest of society, as they 
exist to protect the public (Levine, 2011).   
Corporate governance is used to identify the problem spots where any laws, regu-
lations and tax codes can become incentives which could lead to undesired firm 
behaviour or instability in the financial system (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012). 
Governance of financial institutions depends on two kinds of principles: that is, 
first, which institution is most desirable for the country and, second, the mecha-
nism or institutions needed to achieve that ideal desirability (Mehran and Mol-
lineaux, 2012).  
For banks and other financial institutions to be efficient, regulators can take steps 
to increase market discipline and disclosure, first by mandating the production of 
information outside of markets through increased regulatory disclosure. Infor-
mation disclosure in banks is primarily compliance-based. Second, potential pro-
ducers of information can be motivated by changing their incentives. Executive 
compensation should be linked with market prices of financial instruments. The 
lack of transparency in the banking industry has become a symptom of the causes 
of bad governance. Banks and other financial institutions face corporate govern-
ance problems as a result of the deposits they receive, insurance, and regulation of 
the product and services (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012)34. The failure of banks 
and financial institutions during the financial crisis can be classified into three 
forces. 
First, there is an ideological belief that self-regulation of financial markets has 
been entrenched in all sectors of the economy, which has undermined effective 
public oversight of the markets (Tomasic, 2009). Second, there is a belief that gov-
ernment monitoring of the financial market had the effect that public legal institu-
tions were either underdeveloped or undermined (ibid). Third, the political im-
portance of developing and maintaining London as a major financial centre meant 
political pressure could be seen to have a bearing on regulations and regulators as 
                                                 
33 The internal corporate governance in banks and financial institutions focuses on shareholders and the 
board of directors whilst the external corporate governance concentrates on markets for corporate control 
such as auditors and rating agencies (Hopt, 2013; Levine, 2011). The board of directors has a duty to the 
shareholders to promote safety and soundness in the financial markets and provide an independent over-
sight of management’s decision-making. The board has a responsibility for evaluating the organisational 
strategy, risk appetite, organisation and internal controls. When financial institutions face difficulties, 
the board also faces pressure and its integrity becomes questionable (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012; 
Macey and O’Hara, 2003). 
34 Market participation can exert discipline upon financial firms by ensuring that there is control within the 
banking industry. This control is subject to supervision, regulation and legal requirements. Regulation can 
encourage markets to monitor all the financial institutions. Information and disclosures play a role to min-
imise market failures and regulators can increase market discipline by increasing disclosure and by directly 
motivating potential producers of information through change of incentives (Mehran and Mollineaux, 2012; 




they have to ensure they meet international standards. Any effective corporate reg-
ulatory regime must be based on corporations being committed to maintaining ap-
propriate governance policies and standards as part of corporate culture. Corpora-
tions cannot rely solely on the state to set up policies on intervention and monitor-
ing of the regulation of the financial market if they are not ready to comply with 
any new regulations. Companies should support the state by implementing policies 
set up by the government (Tomasic, 2009). 
Further, rating agencies should evaluate the quality of financial products such as 
swap, derivative and any other conflict of interest that might arise among compa-
nies. However, it is argued that rating agencies played a role in escalating the 
2007/2008 financial crisis (Tomasic, 2009; Coffee, 2009).  
Furthermore, lawyers and auditors in an organisation should play a large role in 
ensuring corporate integrity is maintained and preventing any professional mis-
conduct that may arise as it will undermine corporate effectiveness (Tomasic, 
2009; Armour and McCahery, 2006; Coffee, 2006; Fuchita and Litan, 2006; Dra-
vis, 2007). Additionally, the internal corporate risk monitors should assess risk 
thoroughly, as it proved to be a major problem among banks during the financial 
crisis. For example, Paul Moore in HBOS failed to communicate risk taken by his 
bank to stakeholders before the crisis (Tomasic, 2009). 
Finally, hosting London as a financial centre needs to be balanced by the risks 
that emanate from the companies as it may lead to the need to impose heavy 
financial burdens on taxpayers, who may be called upon to rescue any failed 
financial institution with a view to maintaining stability in the markets (To-
masic, 2009). 
4.3 Too Big to Fail Financial Institutions 
Large financial institutions, especially banks in the UK, were classified as too big 
to fail (TBTF) because of their size, market capitalisation, interconnectedness to 
the global world and years of existence. Banks and building societies such as Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS), which is part of NatWest Bank and was established in 
1727, Lloyds TSB Bank, established in 1965, Northern Rock, 1850, Bradford & 
Bingley, 1851, Dunfermline Building Society, 1869, Bank of Scotland, known as 
HBOS, which was formed in 1695 and is now part of Lloyds Banking Group, Al-
liance & Leicester Bank, which was formed in 1985 and became part of HBOS in 
2001, which is part of the Lloyds Group; these banks have existed too long to have 
failed (Labonte, 2013) 35.  
These banks were rescued by the government (taxpayers’ money) during the fi-
nancial crisis and were classified as too big to fail or systemically important by 
policy-makers as their failure could cause unacceptable disruption to the overall 
                                                 





financial system which would be difficult to contain36. Before the crisis, the gov-
ernment had no policy to rescue TBTF firms, but they were rescued once the crisis 
struck. Taxpayers argued that a bad use of financial decisions must be financially 
punished (Labonte, 2013). 
Interest rates in the UK were cut to 0.5% to make it easier to borrow. ‘Quantitative 
Easing37’ was also introduced as a method of increasing liquidity in the market by 
buying assets from financial institutions in order to inject cash and reduce interest 
rates. A car-scrapping scheme was introduced to encourage the motor industry to 
produce more cars. The government also reduced its expenditure and the public-
sector budget was reviewed in order to avoid waste38 (HM Treasury, 2013; Finan-
cial Service Bill, available from August 2011). 
Before the crisis, the banks held a greater percentage of large assets from insur-
ance, mortgage, mutual funds and brokerage firms, but the financial crisis reduced 
the number of assets and increased mergers and acquisitions among these institu-
tions (Labonte, 2013; Tarullo, 2011). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) ar-
gues that the causes of the financial crisis were due to firms that were too intercon-
nected with each other. This means that any activity or risk in one firm or market 
segment flows easily into another. When an interconnected firm failed, other firms 
had difficulty in absorbing it because of the disruption to the flow of credit (La-
bonte, 2013; IMF Selected Issues, 2009).  
Stakeholders believe government protection for these banks from losses pro-
vided a shield and created an incentive to monitor the banks’ riskiness. Govern-
ment assistance concerning TBTF includes preventing systemic risk from 
spreading among the banks and other sectors of the economy and stricter pru-
dential regulation to ensure that investors, rating agencies, creditors and coun-
terparties curb excessive risk-taking by TBTF firms. This regulation will mini-
mise the spillover effect to the economy (Labonte, 2013). Preventing TBTF was 
necessary for maintaining the stability of the financial systems in the short run 
but arguably it is predicted to cause moral hazard, less stable financial systems 
and weaken market discipline in the long run (Labonte, 2013). Moral hazard is 
a situation where TBTF firms expected that their failure could be prevented by 
the government, which will serve as an incentive to take greater risks because 
                                                 
36 In June 2013, Sir Mervyn King, at that time Governor of the Bank of England (BoE), announced during 
the Mansion House speech that these banks are “too big to fail, too big to jail or simply too big”, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-22980749. Accessed on 20/03/14. Also, In July 2013, Marc Labonte, 
specialist in macroeconomic policy, published a paper for the Congressional Research Service on System-
ically Important or ‘Too Big to Fail’ Financial Institutions, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, 
www.crs.go R42150. Accessed on 01/03/14. 
37 The government spent £50bn of its initial £125billion programme of ‘Quantitative Easing’ to pump more 
funds into the economy by purchasing government bonds, Accessed on 02/03/14. 
38 Congressional Research Services (CRS) Report R42083, Financial Stability Oversight Council: A Frame-
work to Mitigate Systemic Risk, by Edward V. Murphy (May 2013). Accessed on 02/03/14. 38 Congres-
sional Research Services (CRS) Report R41073, Government Interventions in Response to Financial Tur-
moil, by Baird Webel and Marc Labonte (February 2010). Accessed on 02/03/14. 38 In July 2013, Marc 
Labonte, specialist in macroeconomic policy published a paper for the Congressional Research Service on 
Systemically Important or ‘Too Big to Fail’’ Financial Institutions. Congressional research Service 7-5700, 





they are shielded from any negative effect of those risks. The incentive to sup-
port TBTF created the government responsibility of bearing any extreme losses 
they incurred39. 
Government rescue benefited firm’s management, owners (shareholders), credi-
tors, depositors, account holders and counterparts. Depending on government as-
sistance, all these stakeholders could be protected from losses. As part of govern-
ment rescue, management was replaced; for example, the rescue of RBS, Northern 
Rock and HBOS called for the removal of the then CEOs of the banks. When man-
agement believe that losses will lead to their removal, they will prefer to take ex-
cessive risk which will guarantee them higher expected profit or returns leading to 
higher bonuses. Shareholders also bore some losses through stock dilution, which 
was smaller than if the company had filed for bankruptcy (Labonte, 2013).  
As part of rescuing the TBTF banks, the Bank of England (BoE) tightened capital 
and liquidity standards among banks as part of the prudential regulation. This ini-
tiative was supported by the Basel III accord of new international capital require-
ment among banks. The banks are subjected to higher capital standards and a 
higher supplementary leverage ratio. The Bank of England (BoE), which has full 
oversight of bank supervision and regulation, can eliminate TBTF firms by chang-
ing their size: banks should be required to sell part of their businesses, divest assets 
or break up to the point that they are no longer TBTF. 
Banks should be prevented from holding or operating in multiple lines of financial 
business such as banking, investment, insurance and mortgages. If these lines of 
business can be separated, it will eliminate the TBTF problem. Reducing the firm 
could reduce the riskiest activities of large firms and make it easier to regulate and 
monitor their activities. A policy can be established to limit or ban TBTF firms 
engaging in activities that are deemed to be too risky. For example, banks have 
been urged not to participate in proprietary trading of private securities with their 
own funds or engage in derivatives (Labonte, 2013)40.  
 Also, lack of regulatory authority and failed regulation contributed to the TBTF 
problem in the recent crisis41. Regulation and supervision could be used to control 
and guide the banks and financial institutions. The Basel III international agree-
ment on banks’ regulation, capital and liquidity standards should be taken seriously 
(Labonte, 2013). 
Finally, the crisis led to the establishment of additional corporate governance re-
forms to prevent this from occurring again. For example, the Walker Review 
(2009), Financial Service Bill (2010) and FRC (2012, 2014, 2016). Also, the gov-
ernment created a new Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) headed by the Bank of 
                                                 
39 Bank of England (BoE) Prudential Regulation on Banks: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
PRA/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 10/03/14. 
40 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Governmental Rescues of ‘Too Big To Fail’ Financial Institu-
tions,” Preliminary Staff Report, August 2010, Ch. 3, http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-re-
ports/2010-0831-Governmental-Rescues.pdf. Accessed on 10/03/14. 
41 Andrew Haldane and Robert May, “Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems,” Nature, vol. 469, January 




England (BoE) and a single financial regulator known as the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009). The purpose of all these reforms 
and regulation is to cover any overlaps in corporate governance policies and avoid 
future market failures in UK financial institutions. 
4.4 Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis 
When large banks and other financial institutions were affected during the finan-
cial crisis, it created a concern about their corporate governance (Sun et al., 2011). 
The concern was whether those institutions had proper corporate governance prac-
tice before and during the financial crisis. According to Sun et al. (2011), those 
institutions were involved in the innovation of new financial products, derivative 
and investment trading, which were highly risky and formed the basis of the crisis. 
According to Sun et al. (2011), there has been a debate about the extent to which 
corporate governance contributed to the crisis; this debate has created three differ-
ent views and positions on the subject, as outlined below42.  
The first view is that the crisis had little to do with or was unrelated to the compa-
nies’ corporate governance. According to Sun et al. (2011), researchers have ar-
gued that, since the 1970s, corporate governance in the United States, Europe and 
other countries has improved significantly (Adams, 2009; Cheffins, 2009). For ex-
ample, companies have introduced independent directors, and implemented board 
committees such as nomination, audit and compensation committees. Chair/CEO 
positions have been separated and salaries of company executives have increased 
to ensure transparency and accountability. Minority shareholders have been pro-
tected, institutional shareholders have become more active in monitoring and com-
panies have created value incentives for shareholders (Adams, 2009; Cheffins, 
2009).  
Also, since the 1990s, corporate governance codes in many countries have im-
proved and other international organisations such as the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International Settle-
ments, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Securities and Exchange 
Commissions, Cadbury Report, Combined Code, Financial Reporting Council, the 
World Bank and the IMF have intensively spread and encouraged the strengthen-
ing of corporate governance practices among companies and countries to ensure 
that investors are protected. Corporate accountability and transparency have im-
proved as a result of these interventions (Rezaee, 2007). The conclusion concern-
ing this argument is that companies were governed satisfactorily before and during 
the financial crisis (Cheffins, 2009).  
However, with no significant correlation between corporate governance and the 
financial crisis, Cheffins (2009) argues that the sharp decline of stock markets in 
2008 did not necessarily relate to firm performance; his argument is based on an 
empirical study of 37 firms from the S&P 500 index during 2008. He concluded 
                                                 




that corporate governance in those firms functioned well and did not fail during 
the financial crisis (Cheffins, 2009; Sun et al. 2012).  
The second view of the debate is that the financial crisis was associated with corpo-
rate governance policies that were not well implemented among companies. Lack 
of implementation caused the failure (Sun et al. 2011). According to the OECD Ster-
ling Group on Corporate Governance, there were four weak areas in corporate gov-
ernance which contributed to the financial crisis: executive remuneration, risk man-
agement, board practices and the exercise of shareholder rights (Sun et al. 2011). 
Each member country agreed to comply with all four areas even before the crisis, 
but major failure among institutions during the crisis appears to be due to lack of 
implementation of the principles (OECD, 2009). According to the OECD, an inef-
fective implementation of existing corporate governance arrangements and princi-
ples was the key issue that caused the financial crisis (Sun et al., 2011).  
The OECD committee stated that using voluntary codes and corporate initiative is 
the best way to implement any legislation and regulation regarding corporate gov-
ernance. The Financial Reporting Council in the UK (2010) states that there were 
no major problems with corporate governance codes prior to the financial crisis, 
and the only problem was with the implementation of the codes and principles by 
companies. If a company can comply with the code, this in itself constitutes good 
governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2010; Sun et al. 2011). 
The third view in the debate is that systemic failure of corporate governance caused 
part of the financial crisis. Identification of OECD areas of corporate failure in the 
second debate cannot be agreed with by all stakeholders. Many stakeholders are of 
the view that the failure of the companies during the financial crisis may not be 
purely an implementation issue, but a fundamental systemic failure of institutional 
arrangements supported by shareholder interest, profit maximisation, incentive 
systems, rational human behaviour, agency problems and efficient markets for cor-
porate control (Sun et al. 2011). 
According to Heineman (2008), the board failure during the financial crisis con-
stituted systemic failure of the broad governance movement in the organisation. 
Caulkin (2009) states that the financial crisis was due to both the failure of the 
invisible hand of market (board of directors) and a failure of the visible hand of 
management. 
In current times, corporate governance has centred on how to increase sharehold-
ers’ wealth and how agents pursue self-seeking projects. Caulkin (2009) argues 
that the Anglo-American corporate governance paradigm troubled the financial in-
dustry and the entire economy. Visser (2010) states that greed has been encouraged 
in our industry due to government policies, institutional arrangement, ideologies 
and culture. Agents have become self-seeking, leading to executive greed, lever-
aging and risk transfer, which has also led to banking and financial market greed. 
Sun et al. (2011) argue that the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, 
especially in the US, has permitted or tolerated excess power and wealth at the 




order to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders, investors and other 
stakeholders. The Anglo-American model of capitalism has been promoted to the 
world and evidence shows it led to the collapse of the financial institutions during 
the crisis. 
Sun et al. (2011) support the third debate above and agree that corporate govern-
ance reforms in developed countries have generated fruitful outcomes, such as in-
dependent boards, establishment of committees, shareholder activism and widely 
accepted codes and principles as best practices. Sun et al. (2011) further state that 
the problems of corporate governance can be systemic and fundamental issues 
which involve models, approaches and the orientation of corporate governance 
systems.  
4.5 Corporate Governance Reforms 
From 1918 to 1982, the British government improved and amended the Companies 
Act laws, industrial laws and insolvency laws practice. The objectives of these 
amendments were to attract foreign investors, protect workers, and sustain and main-
tain companies. From 1992 onwards, corporate governance practice was established 
and has become part of the rules guiding the way businesses should operate. The 
Cadbury Report (1992, s.2.5) defined corporate governance as the “system by which 
companies are directed and controlled”. In addition to that, in 1995, the Greenbury 
Report was introduced to help handle remuneration packages for the CEO and other 
directors. The Hampel Report (1998) was established to help review the Cadbury 
and Greenbury reports and inform companies about the positive contribution of 
good corporate governance. Further, the Combined Code was introduced in 1998 to 
formulate a consolidation of all corporate governance principles in the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel reports. However, internal control and risk management in 
an organisation was address by the Turnbull’s report (1999). 
Also, Myners’ (2001) report was established to promote greater shareholder activ-
ism and enhance institutional investors. Additionally, the FSA Review (2002) 
made some changes to corporate governance policies in September 2002 because 
of significant changes in both European Union and UK regulatory environments. 
Higgs’ (2003) report focused on the role and effectiveness of Non-Executive Di-
rectors (NEDs), which covers the number of meetings the board should have, re-
porting the committee’s activities annually, together with the attendance records 
of individual directors. Furthermore, Tyson’s (2003) corporate governance reform 
report focused on the recruitment and development of NEDs and how board mem-
bership could be broadened, and recommended that board diversity in background, 
skills and experience of NEDs could enhance board effectiveness by bringing a 
wider range of knowledge on issues relating to corporate performance and improve 
stakeholders’ relationships.  
Additionally, Smith’s (2003) report states that audit committees should act inde-




financial reporting and internal control. Also, in 2003, the Combined Code com-
mittee recommended that there should be no concentration of power in the hands 
of one or two individuals and that at least half of the board should be Independent 
Non-Executive Directors (INEDs). The Financial Reporting Council (2004) report 
was set up in March 2004 and included five major reporting bodies: the Account-
ing Standard Board (ASB), the Auditing Practices Board (APB), the Professional 
Oversight Board for Accountancy (POBA), the Financial Reporting Review Panel 
(FRRP), and the Accountancy Investigation and Discipline Board (AIDB). The 
aim of the FRC committee was to maintain an effective combined code on corpo-
rate governance and promote its widespread application. 
Myners’ (2004) report centred on how managers will be more accountable to institu-
tional investors in terms of delivery performance. Also, the Turnbull Guidance Report 
(2005) was established to address risks and issues associated with companies hiring 
external auditors. The report recommended that companies have robust internal con-
trols. Besides, in 2006, the Combined Code corporate governance reform report states 
that the company chairperson should serve on (but not as chair of) the remuneration 
committee, where s/he is considered independent on appointment as chair and that the 
positions of chair and CEO should not be occupied by a single person. 
During the financial crisis, the Turner Review report (2009) was established to 
assess the causes of the global financial crisis in order to make changes to regula-
tion and supervision within the banking systems. In the same vein, the Walker 
Review (2009) was also established after the financial crisis to help assess the cor-
porate governance issues in the banking and financial industry during the financial 
crisis. In addition to that, in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016, the Financial Reporting 
Council reviewed available corporate governance codes and encouraged share-
holders to monitor the codes as well. Emphasis about the corporate governance 
reforms was also placed on the board’s leadership, effectiveness, accountability, 
remuneration, high-quality audit, risk management, internal control, and financial 
and business reporting among the firms.  
Various corporate governance reforms took place after the first Cadbury Report in 
1992, aiming at protecting shareholders’ rights, reducing agency conflict, improv-
ing executives’ (managers’) accountability, ensuring transparency to all stakehold-
ers and conforming to international good governance practice. Every reform ad-
dresses one corporate failure or another that happens from time to time. When 
corporations fail to perform based on expected standards, it means corporate gov-
ernance policies have also failed to address the relevant issues and therefore cor-
porate governance standards have broken down (Christine, 2006; Wearing, 2005). 
Continuous reform is needed to cover any overlap in corporate governance policies 
and avoid market failures. However, whether any new reform (new guidance and 
codes) is sufficient to help prevent any future occurrences of failed corporate gov-
ernance, only time will tell.  
Table 2 below gives the full details of various corporate governance reforms which 









The committee was established to amend the Companies Acts 1908-17, 
particularly due to the Second World War, which affected the economy, 
and to attract foreign capital into the country. 
Greene Commit-
tee (1926) 
The committee was established to report on the Company Law amendment. 
Here, a statutory law was proposed for companies to set up an account for 





This formed part of the Company Law Amendment. The committee rec-
ommended that shareholders be given a greater degree of control over di-





The committee also reported on the Company Act 1948; here, prevention 





The committee came up with a recommendation on how to handle indus-
trial action, which was rampant at that time. The idea was to solve industrial 




The committee dealt with insolvency law and practice. They recommended 
reforms of the UK insolvency law. There were too many companies going 
bankrupt and that were left to die. Cork advocated a rescue culture and 
companies’ restoration. 
Cadbury (1992) The Cadbury committee dealt with the issue of the quality of a company’s 
financial reporting. Their report also outlined board composition, the ap-
pointment and independence of non-executive directors, executive direc-
tors’ contracts and remuneration, and a company’s financial reporting and 
controls. They also required a company to have a minimum of three non-
executive directors. The first official definition of corporate governance 




The Greenbury committee focused mainly on board remuneration, which 
includes the establishment of a remuneration committee for setting the re-
muneration packages for the CEO and other directors. Disclosure of direc-
tors’ remuneration and remuneration policy was recommended. 
Hampel (1998) The committee was set up to review the Cadbury and Greenbury reports, 
aiming to avoid a ‘box-ticking’ exercise by the companies. The aim was to 
inform companies about the positive contribution of good corporate gov-
ernance. Companies were recommended to use corporate governance to of-
fer safeguarding for shareholders’ investment through a sound system of 
internal control and risk management. 
Combined Code 
(1998) 
The Combined Code was formulated through a consolidation of all princi-
ples and recommendations outlined in the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel 
reports. This was updated in 2003, incorporating the recommendations 
from the Higgs review (2003) and Smith (2003). It states that at least one-
third of the board should be non-executive directors. 
Turnbull (1999) This committee dealt with internal control and risk management in an or-
ganisation and stressed that the responsibility of the board is to ensure that 
internal control systems are in place and that companies should report on 
their systems of internal control and risk management to shareholders. 








The Financial Service Authority made some changes to corporate govern-
ance policies in September 2002 because of significant changes in both Eu-
ropean Union and UK regulatory environments. This review included as-
sessing the existing rules on corporate governance, making sure that there 
are continuing obligations encompassing corporate communication, share-
holders’ rights and ensuring financial information is available for investors. 
Higgs (2003) The committee focused on the role and effectiveness of Non-Executive Di-
rectors (NEDs), which includes the number of meetings the board should 
have, reporting the committee’s activities annually together with the attend-
ance records of individual directors. Also, the CEO should not at the same 
time become the chair of the same company. The NEDs should also meet 
as a group once a year without executive directors being present. The com-
pany annual report should indicate whether such meetings have occurred. 
Tyson (2003) 
 
The committee focused on the recruitment and development of NEDs and 
how board membership could be broadened. They recommended that board 
diversity in background, skills and experience of NEDs could enhance 
board effectiveness by bringing a wider range of knowledge on issues re-
lating to corporate performance and improve stakeholders’ relationships. 
Smith (2003) The committee states that audit committees should act independently from 
the executive to protect the interests of shareholders in relation to financial 
reporting and internal control. The committee states that the role of external 
auditors and their relationship with companies. This is similar to the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, 2002. 
Combined Code 
(2003) 
The committee recommended that there should be no concentration of 
power in the hands of one or two individuals and that at least half of the 
board should be Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs). The Code 
also stated that, except for smaller companies, at least half of the board, 
excluding the chair, should comprise NEDs as a determinant of board in-





This was set up in March 2004 and comprised five major reporting bodies: 
the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) the Auditing Practices Board 
(APB), the Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy (POBA) the Fi-
nancial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP), and the Accountancy Investiga-
tion and Discipline Board (AIDB). The aim of the committee was to main-
tain an effective combined code on corporate governance and promote its 
widespread application, giving guidance on internal control, influencing 
EU and other corporate governance developments, maintaining boardroom 
professionalism and diversity, encouraging company boards and, finally, to 
help institutional shareholders to interact effectively. 
Myners (2004) Assessed institutional investment. This helps to monitor and make manag-




Revised Turnbull guidance was issued in 2006, aimed at encouraging or-
ganisations to take account of risks associated with their external auditor 
leaving the market. They recommended that organisations should disclose 
more information to shareholders and other stakeholders concerning audi-
tor selection. They also considered the impact of internal control as a way 
of improving companies. 
Combined Code 
(2006) 
The Combined Code 2006 suggests that the company chairperson should 
serve on (but not as chair of) the remuneration committee, where s/he is 
considered independent on appointment as chair. At least half of the board 
of directors should be independent NEDs, the positions of chair and CEO 
should not be occupied by a single person, and Senior Independent Direc-
tors (SIDs) should be appointed. The committee also states that boards 
should undertake a formal and rigorous evaluation of their own perfor-
mance, and institutional investors should also avoid ‘box ticking’ when as-





Companies should apply formal and transparent procedures when recruit-
ing new directors and NEDs should only be reappointed after six years’ 
service; their reappointment should also be very rigorous. Finally, NEDs 
can only continue with their service after nine years following annual re-
elections and they should be considered as no longer independent. 
Turner Review 
(2009) 
Assessed the causes of the global financial crisis in order to make changes 
to regulation and supervision within the banking systems. Turner recom-
mended that firms should have remuneration policies that are consistent 
with risk management in the company and that remuneration committees 
should make independent judgements on remuneration, risk and risk man-
agement. Finally, international regulatory bodies around the world should 
help to solve the financial crisis since they contributed to it. 
Walker Review 
(2009) 
Walker (2009) assessed the corporate governance in the banking and finan-
cial industry during the financial crisis. His recommendations included risk 
management at board level, remuneration incentive, and a balance of skills 
and experience among directors and executives. Effective board practice 
and independence was required for a company’s performance. Audit, risk, 
remuneration and nomination committees were recommended. The role of 
institutional shareholders in engaging and monitoring of board effective-




Regulated banks and other financial institutions on remuneration of execu-
tives, rules by FSA and their disciplinary power, short selling and consumer 




The FRC report (2010) focused on addressing the financial crisis and as-
sessed corporate governance compliance in other listed companies. The re-
port encouraged shareholders to monitor the corporate governance code 
and ensure that the board followed it. Boards were encouraged to think 




The FRC report (2012) focused on the board’s leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration and relations with shareholders. The code is 
there to guide board members on how best they can discharge their respon-




The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) emphasised risk management, 
internal control, and related financial and business reporting among firms. 
The report states that the board should also explain to shareholders any risks 




The UK Corporate Governance Code (2016) focused on enhancing high-
quality audit and assurance work, proposed revisions to the ethical stand-
ard, auditing standards and UK corporate governance code, and provided 
guidance on audit committees. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the financial services industry in the UK and draws lessons 
from various corporate governance reforms that have taken place. The sector offers 
service products such as banking, insurance, mortgage, asset management and mu-
tual funds. 
The management of these financial industries goes beyond shareholders (equity 
governance) to include employees, boards of directors such as audit, remuneration 
and nomination committees, creditors, debtors and the government (Hopt, 2013; 




experience from decision-makers – for example, audit, remuneration and nomina-
tion committees – in their discharge of duties and responsibilities to the firm. This 
knowledge and experience should help the decision-makers in their understanding 
of financial products, risk management, internal controls and the appointment of 
members for executive positions. Any failure of responsibility on the part of man-
agement and the board will have consequences for the firm’s corporate govern-
ance. 
The financial services industry in the UK has encountered various corporate gov-
ernance reforms since the 2007/2008 crisis. The aims of these reforms are to pro-
tect shareholders’ rights, reduce agency conflict, improve executives’ (managers’) 
accountability, ensure transparency to all stakeholders, conform to international 






5 THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE BOARD 
AND ITS COMMITTEES 
5.1 The Board Structure 
Corporate board structure can be classified as either unitary (one-tier) or dual board 
(two-tier) depending on the country. A unitary board of directors is a form of board 
structure which is characterised by one single board, which consists of both man-
agement and non-executive or independent directors. The unitary board is respon-
sible for all aspect of the company’s activities. The shareholders elect the directors 
of the board at the company’s annual general meeting to help manage the company 
on their behalf (Mallin, 2006). The unitary board structure is predominant in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States, the UK, Ireland, Australia and 
Canada. The unitary board consists of executives or managers of the company, 
non-executive directors (NEDs) and independent non-executive directors (INEDs) 
with no ties to the company (Kojima, 1997).43 
A dual board, on the other hand, consists of a supervisory board and an executive 
board of management. The dual board creates a clear separation between the func-
tions of supervision – that of monitoring – and of management. The duty of the 
supervisory board is to oversee the direction of the business whilst the management 
board is responsible for the running of the business. Members of one board cannot 
be members of the other, creating a distinction between management and control 
(Mallin, 2006). It is the responsibility of shareholders to appoint the members of 
the supervisory board whilst the supervisory board appoints the members of the 
                                                 
43 The Executive Directors are employees of the company and operate under a contract for services. Exam-
ples are the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Finance Officer (CFO) and Chief Operational Officer 
(COO). The Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) are not 
employees but operate under a contract of services. The NEDs and INEDs are appointed by the company 
shareholders to oversee the activities of the executives in the company. The NEDs and INEDs also appoint 
the executives to run the day-to-day business of the company (Kojima, 1997).  
An Independent Non-Executive Director (INED) does not have any material or personal relationship 
with the company except his/her sitting fees. Unlike a Non-executive Director (NED), who can own shares 
or probably be a former CEO, CFO or COO in the same company, an independent non-executive director 
(INED) is an independent member who only comes to provide professional, practical and intellectual advice 
to the board. INEDs are mostly finance experts, lawyers, IT experts or people with a large amount of work-
ing experience in similar industries (Kojima, 1997).  
The role of the NEDs and INEDs is to provide strategic advice to the company and monitor and super-
vise operational activities in the company. They are seen as experts and they form part of the audit, nomi-
nation, compensation and compliance or risk committees (CIMA 2006).  Due to the criteria for the selection 
of Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs), they are seen as people who give an independent judge-
ment on issues of strategy, performance, resources, appointments and standards of conduct (Kojima, 1997). 
The executive directors or management are seen as internal directors while NEDs or INEDs are referred to 




management board (Mallin, 2006). The two-tier board operates in countries such 
as Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Japan and China (Mallin, 2006).  
Both systems (unitary and dual) appoint the members of the managerial body or 
team, and in one-tier (unitary) systems there is a closer relationship and better in-
formation flow among directors (executive and non-executive directors) whilst, in 
the dual board, there is a more distinct and formal separation between the supervi-
sory board and those being supervised, because of the separation of management 
board and supervisory board structures (Mallin, 2006). The UK operates a unitary 
board responsible for the management and governance of the company (Tricker, 
1996). Under the unitary board, all executive directors appear to be monitoring and 
supervising their own performance (CIMA, 2006). In addition to that, in the two-
tier structure, members of the supervisory and executive boards meet separately 
and do not share the same responsibilities, making it difficult for the two boards to 
interact, exchange views and experiences together, unlike the unitary board 
(Walker Review, 2009). According to the Walker Review (2009), the two-tier 
model did not yield better outcomes than the unitary boards in the period before 
the recent crisis.  
The role of the non-executive directors will be discussed in the next section. 
5.2 The Role of Non-Executive Directors 
The appointment of non-executive directors (NEDs) has been suggested as a way 
in which a firm can reduce agency costs and information asymmetry problems 
(Fama, 1980; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 2001). The “responsibilities of the 
NED are to control executive directors to ensure that an individual person or 
group cannot unduly influence the board’s decisions. Secondly, the non-executive 
directors can contribute to the general leadership and development of the com-
pany”44 (Cadbury, 1992; s.4.10-4.12). According to the Walker Review (2009), 
NEDs should be knowledgeable and understand the nature of the business in order 
to contribute during board discussions. The NEDs should be given induction and 
orientation about the company before they assume responsibility. They should de-
vote between 30 and 36 days’ time commitment for their role. This should be in-
dicated in their letter of appointment. The NEDs are part of the unitary board and 
they should be able to challenge and test proposals on strategy put forward by the 
executive. 
NEDs are expected to monitor executive directors’ actions and to work with them 
as part of the board. They have a responsibility for checking the integrity of financial 
reporting, nomination of executives and executive remuneration. Where necessary, 
NEDs can remove an executive director and plan for a successor. NEDs should con-
structively challenge and help develop proposals on company strategy, scrutinise the 
performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives, and monitor 
                                                 




performance (Cadbury, 1992). They also have to put in place systems of risk man-
agement which are robust and defensible (Cadbury, 1992)45. These duties can some-
times create a conflict of interest, as discussed by Ezzanel and Watson (1997). The 
OECD (2004) principle also argues that boards should consider assigning a suffi-
cient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent 
judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest.  
However, there are two theoretical views on NEDs; that is, those in favour of more 
NEDs or those who prefer more executive directors on corporate boards (Fama, 
1980; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 2001). Those who support more NEDs on 
the board usually base their arguments on three theories: resource independence 
theory, agency theory, and information asymmetry and signalling. Agency theory 
proposes that boards dominated by inside executive directors are less accountable 
(Fama, 1980; Sonnenfeld, 2002). In line with Fama’s (1980) argument, NEDs pos-
sess some important features. First, they bring independent judgement to the board, 
which enhances decision-making (Cadbury Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grin-
stein, 2009). Second, they offer their expertise in the form of skills, experience, 
business contacts and personal reputation (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Baranchuk 
and Dybvig, 2009). Finally, the existence of competitive and efficient labour mar-
kets both within and outside the firm ensures that NEDs perform their monitoring 
function effectively and efficiently (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Also, 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that, once top internal manage-
ment gain control of the corporate board, they are more likely to cooperate among 
themselves to deprive shareholders of their wealth. This also reduces healthy com-
petition among managers to improve their performance. 
Furthermore, Black et al. (2006) argue that the appointment of independent NEDs 
helps to reduce information asymmetry by credibly signalling insiders’ intent to 
treat outsiders or potential shareholders fairly and, by implication, ensures the 
safety of their investment. This will also send signals to market insiders to rely on 
the decisions of experts, as well as an appreciation of the importance of separating 
the decision-making and control functions (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
However, relating to stewardship theory, there is an argument that, if a corporate 
board is dominated by NEDs, it may impact negatively on firm performance 
(Baysinger and Hookisson, 1990; Weir and Laing, 2000; Bozec, 2005). Weir and 
Laing (2000) assert that NEDs often command less knowledge about the business 
and find it too difficult to understand the complexities of the company. This prob-
lem is that outside directors are usually part-timers who also sit on different com-
pany boards, leaving them with very little time to devote to their monitoring and 
advisory duties (Bozec, 2005; Jiraporn et al. 2009). 
By contrast, Nicholson and Kiel (2003) argue that high levels of executive direc-
torships are linked with high access to information, which leads to high quality in 
                                                 
45 The Cadbury Report suggests that NEDs should “be selected with the same impartiality and care as 
senior executives and they should be selected through a formal process and their appointment should be 
considered by the board as a whole” (Cadbury, 1992, p.4.15). The Cadbury Report also states that the 
calibre of the non-executive members of the board is of special importance in setting and maintaining 




decision-making, which can impact positively on firm financial performance. Cru-
cially, “outside directors would usually not have the same access to informal 
sources of information and knowledge within the firm, as a result of that, decisions 
made by a board dominated by NEDs would be of a lower quality”, which would 
then lead to low firm performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; pp.589). It has also 
been argued by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that corporate boards dominated by 
outside directors tend to hold back managerial initiative and strategic actions as a 
result of excessive managerial supervision. 
Prior empirical evidence regarding the percentage of NEDs and a firm’s financial 
performance suggests a mixed relationship. The literature indicates that boards dom-
inated by NEDs deliver higher performances (Weir et al. 2002). Weir et al. (2002) 
used Tobin’s Q and a sample of 311 UK listed firms from 1994 to 1996, in which 
they reported a positive relationship between the percentage of NEDs and a firm’s 
performance. Gupta and Fields (2009) examined a US sample of 744 independent 
NED resignations from 1990 to 2003 to ascertain the value that the market places on 
board independence. They reported that, on average, the announcement of independ-
ent NED resignations results in a 1.22% loss in a firm’s market value. This suggests 
that investors appreciate board independence, as independent boards are associated 
with greater monitoring of managerial behaviour (Gupta and Fields, 2009). Also, 
Mangena and Tauringana (2008) reported that boards dominated by NEDs perform 
better, based on a sample of Tunisian and Zimbabwean listed firms respectively. 
By contrast, other researchers have reported a negative percentage of NEDs link 
with firm performance (Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Laing and 
Weir, 1999). For example, Bozec (2005), using a sample of 25 Canadian firms 
from 1976 to 2005, finds that the relationship between the percentage of NEDs and 
performance is negative. 
Similarly, Sanda et al. (2005) report that Nigerian firms with a low percentage of 
outside directors perform better than those with more NEDs. This suggests that NEDs 
can bring independence and experience to bear upon board decisions. Vefeas and 
Theodorou (1998), Weir and Laing (2000) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) indicate 
that the percentage of NEDs has no impact on performance. For example, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991) used a sample of 142 US listed firms in which they reported no 
relationship between board composition and performance. Vefeas and Theodorus 
(1998) conducted a study in the UK to find out the wealth effects of outside directors, 
which was statistically insignificant. Furthermore, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) used 
a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms, in which they reported a statistically insig-
nificant relationship between the percentage of NEDs and performance. 
5.3 Board of Directors and the Establishment of Committees 
The board of directors is elected by shareholders to scrutinise the highest decisions 




odorou, 1998). Board of directors exist not only because of state or country incor-
poration laws but also because the boards serve as market solutions to organisa-
tional problems46 (Bozec, 2005). According to Kang et al. (2007), the board of 
directors is part of the company’s internal governance mechanism which ensures 
that the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned. 
The directors of the board perform the dual functions of monitoring and advising 
the executive on important decisions concerning the company (Baldenius et al. 
2014). This statement has been supported by Harrison (1987), who argues that 
there are two generic types of board committee – that is, monitoring or oversight 
and management supporting or operating. The monitoring or oversight is intended 
to protect shareholder interests by providing an objective and independent review 
of the corporate executive. The operating board committees advise management 
and the board on any major business decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The board manages the business and affairs of the corporation 
(Eisenberg, 1992). Fama and Jensen (1979) stated that the primary responsibility 
of the board is to provide expert information, evaluate existing information and 
ratify the firm’s long-term strategies and investment decisions.  
The monitoring and advising of upper management is to reduce agency conflicts 
(Klein, 1998; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Shareholders want managers to work in 
their interest; that is, maximise shareholders’ wealth. Managers, in contrast, may 
maximise their own personal satisfaction by engaging in self-dealing activities 
(ibid). Agency theory suggests that a central monitoring function of the board is to 
ensure that corporate activities are properly audited. The board should also ensure 
that directors and senior management are adequately remunerated and nominate 
qualified individuals for appointments to fill directorial and top management po-
sitions (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn et al. 2009)47. Almost every 
corporate governance code has called for institutions to establish board committees 
in order to help improve board efficiency (Cadbury Report, 1992; Combined Code, 
1998 and 2006; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).  
The establishment of subcommittees covers areas such as auditing, remuneration, 
nomination, etc. (Charkham, 2005; FRC, 2014). These committees are appointed 
to assist in the dispatch of business activities by considering more detail than 
would be convenient for the whole board. Second, the committees are established 
to increase objectivity because of inherent conflicts of interest such as executive 
remuneration, etc. The Cadbury Report recommended that audit and remuneration 
committees should be formed and also proposed that a nomination committee 
should also be established in order to bring transparency to the appointment of 
board members. This has also been confirmed by the Combined Code (2006) and 
                                                 
46 According to Monks and Minow (2004), the board serves as the link between the people who provide 
capital (the shareholders) and the people who add value to the capital (the managers). The board also be-
comes the liaison between either the concentrated or dispersed shareholders of a company. Ibrahim and 
Angelidis (1994) stated that the board holds the final accountability and responsibility for corporate success 
or failure.  
47 As formulated in the OECD Corporate Governance Principles (2004), which state that Board members 
should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care and in the best interest of 




the Financial Reporting Council (2012; 2014 and 2016), which states that there 
should be a nomination committee to lead the board appointment processes. Ji-
raporn et al. (2009), using data from the investor responsibility research centre 
(IRRC), argue that board committees help to improve board efficiency.  
The empirical evidence on the role of the board and board subcommittees shows 
mixed results. Wild (1994), Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009), Sun and Cahan 
(2009) and Harrison (1987), all using US data, indicate that there is a positive result 
between board committees and firm performance. For example, Wild (1994) used 
a sample of 260 US firms from 1966 to 1980 to examine market reaction before 
and after the establishment of audit committees. His evidence suggested that their 
presence can enhance managerial accountability to shareholders. Harrison (1987) 
argued that the composition of board committees helps in bringing individual di-
rectors’ specialist knowledge and expertise to bear on the board decision-making 
process. He stated that it allows the main board to devote attention to specific areas 
of strategic interests and responsibility.  
Evidence provided by Karamanous and Vefeas (2005) using a sample of 275 For-
tune 500 firms indicated that the presence of audit committees is positively asso-
ciated with financial performance. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) used a sample of 
81 South African listed firms and concluded that the presence of an audit commit-
tee significantly reduces the possibility of a firm being suspended from the stock 
exchange. This means that the presence of audit committees improves internal 
monitoring, reduces internal fraud and enhances compliance with corporate regu-
lations. Vefeas (1999) used a sample of 606 large US listed firms, in which he 
documented a positive relationship between the establishment of nomination com-
mittees and the quality of new director appointments. This means that a nomination 
committee can improve board quality, which can improve the effectiveness with 
which it carries out its monitoring and advisory roles. In separate studies, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009) each used a sample 
of US listed firms in which they reported a significant decrease in CEO compen-
sation for those companies that had compensation committees compared with 
those without compensation committees. This suggests that the establishment of 
independent compensation committees is linked with better monitoring of mana-
gerial compensation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
In contrast, other researchers have evidence that the presence of board committees 
impacts negatively on firm performance. For example, Main and Johnston (1993) 
used a sample of 220 large British listed firms to examine the role of the remuner-
ation committee in British boardrooms. They reported that the presence of a remu-
neration committee is associated with higher executive pay, which reduces share-
holder value. Similarly, Vefeas (1999) investigated 307 US listed firms from 1990 
to 1994, and he reported a negative relationship between the establishment of 
board committees (such as audit, remuneration and nomination) and the value of a 
firm. Also, Yermack (1996), Klein (1998) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) all 
find a negative relationship between board compositions and firm performance. 




the percentage of outsiders on the board; they state that boards are not optimally 
constructed to maximise firm value.  
Finally, other research studies suggest no empirical relationship between board 
committees and performance (Klein, 1998; Vefeas and Theodorous, 1998; Laing 
and Weir, 1999). Klein (1998) used a sample of 486 US firms over the period 1992 
to 1993 to examine the association between the presence of audit, compensation 
and nomination committees and financial performance, but found no statistically 
significant relationship. Klein (1998) demonstrated that her result is robust irre-
spective of the changes in the composition of the committee’s membership. Vafeas 
and Theodorous (1998) used 250 UK listed firms in 1994 to investigate the impact 
of audit, remuneration and nomination committees on the performance of these 
companies. They found no evidence in favour of the idea that the existence of the 
three board committees significantly affects financial performance. Further, stud-
ies conducted by Laing and Weir (1999), Weir et al. (2002) and Bozec (2005) using 
data from the UK indicate that the establishment of a board committee has no sig-
nificant impact on the firm’s financial performance. Furthermore, Dulewicz and 
Herbert (2004) use data from the US and ascertain that the establishment of a board 
committee has no significant impact on the firm’s financial performance.  
Finally, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Daily and Dalton (1992) and Daily and 
Dalton, (1992) find no relation between board composition and firm performance; 
their view is that the relative percentage of inside (outside) directors has no bearing 
on how well firms do.  
The establishment of key board committees such as audit, remuneration and nom-
ination, and board gender diversity are discussed in the next sections. 
5.3.1 The Audit Committee 
The audit committee is one important committee for a board. The Smith Review 
made clear the important role of the audit committee, such as acting independently 
from the executive and ensuring that the interests of shareholders are protected in 
relation to financial reporting and internal control (Smith Review, 2002). The audit 
committee role in terms of ‘oversight’ ‘assessment’ and’ review’ indicates the 
high-level overview that audit committees should take and also ensures that they 
have adequate systems of control in place. They are also responsible for reviewing 
the scope and outcome of the audit and to ensure that the objectivity of the auditors 
is maintained, such as reviewing of audit fees and fees paid for any non-audit work, 
and the independence of the auditors. The committee serves as a bridge between 
the internal and external auditors and the board, in order to ensure that the board 
is fully aware of all relevant issues related to the audit. The committee may also 
be involved in arrangements for whistle-blowers and also assess any systems in 
place to identify and manage financial and non-financial risk in the company 
(Mallin, 2006). The Combined Code (2006) states that the board should establish 




the members should all be independent non-executive directors and at least one 
should have relevant experience in that area (Combined Code, 2006). 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) guidance on audit committees, which was 
formerly known as the Smith Report, was first published in 2003 and later updated 
in 2008 and 2012. Other reports such as the Cadbury Report (1992) and the Com-
bined Code (2006) comment on the role and duties of the audit committee. The 
aim of these reports is to assist company boards in implementing a section of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code regarding audit committees and to assist directors 
serving on audit committees in carrying out their role (FRC 2012; Mallin, 2006).  
The audit committee should ultimately be responsible for the appointment, perfor-
mance assessment and dismissal of the Head of Internal Audit or outsourced Inter-
nal Audit Provider (ICGN, 2009). They should meet regularly with the firm’s ex-
ternal and internal auditors to review the company’s financial statements, audit 
process and internal accounting controls. This reduces agency costs and infor-
mation asymmetry, by facilitating the timely release of unbiased accounting infor-
mation by managers to shareholders (Klein, 1998). They may also help to minimise 
financial fraud and increase the firm’s performance (Klein, 1998). The Combined 
Code (2006) states that the board should establish an audit committee of at least 
two or three members, for smaller companies, where members should all be inde-
pendent non-executive directors and at least one should have relevant experience 
in auditing.  
The role and responsibility of the audit committee, according to the FRC and 
ICAEW guidance, are to monitor the integrity of the financial statement, review 
all audit fees, review fees paid for any non-audit work and check the independence 
of the auditors. It is also responsible for reviewing internal financial controls and 
risk management, making recommendations to the board regarding appointment, 
reappointment and removal of external auditors and approving remuneration for 
the board and external auditors (FRC 2012; ICAEW, 2014; Combined Code, 2006; 
Cadbury Report, 1992). The audit committee should ultimately be responsible for 
the appointment, performance assessment and dismissal of the Head of Internal 
Audit in the company (ICGN, 2009). The audit committee meets regularly with 
the firm’s external and internal auditors to review the company’s financial state-
ments, audit process, risk and internal controls, (FRC 2012; ICAEW, 2014).  
The audit committee serves as a bridge between the internal and external auditors 
and the board, should be involved in arrangements for whistle-blowers, and assess 
any systems in place to identify and manage financial and non-financial risks in 
the company (Mallin, 2006). Once these responsibilities take place, the audit com-
mittee will reduce agency costs and information asymmetry as it helps to facilitate 
release of unbiased accounting and financial information by managers to share-
holders in a timelier manner (Klein, 1998). Wild (1994) finds a significant increase 
in the market's reaction to earnings reports released after audit committee for-
mation. This means that, once companies form an audit committee, it will have a 
significant positive impact on their earnings. However, Menon and Williams 




the committee is actually relied on by the board of directors to enhance its moni-
toring ability.  
To reduce information asymmetry, it is recommended that the audit committee 
should be independent and non-executive members of the board (FRC 2008 and 
2012). This assertion has been supported by the Olivencia Report (1998), stating 
that the audit committee should be composed of independent members. Bedard et 
al. (2004) argue that, due to the financial reporting oversight of the audit commit-
tee, it is better for its members to be independent. Cohen and Hanno (2000) state 
that independent audit committee members help to evaluate management decisions 
regarding risk assessment. Research by Klein (1998) and Dechow et al. (1996) 
argues that the inclusion of audit committee members as independent helps to min-
imise financial fraudulent activities in the company. This argument has been sup-
ported by Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007), McMullen (1996), Maassen 
(2002) and Beasley (1994), stating that the inclusion of the audit members on the 
board has a positive impact on the firm and improves both the internal and external 
reporting quality. McMullen (1996) and Maassen (2002) state that the function of 
the audit committee helps to reduce illegal activity and prevent fraudulent financial 
reporting. Beasley (1994) argues that audit committees play an important role in 
preventing and detecting management fraud because audit committee members 
may be often the first non-management personnel to identify a potential irregular-
ity. The audit committee members’ ability to probe decisions made by manage-
ment helps in assessing various management decisions (Gendron et al. 2004). 
Further studies, by Carcello and Neal (2003), find a positive relation between in-
dependent audit committee and company financial reporting disclosure. Good fi-
nancial disclosure creates value and goodwill for a company. Siagian and Tresnan-
ingsih (2011) support the Carcello and Neal (2003) argument by stating that direc-
tors and audit committees that are independent from management should improve 
the firm’s reporting system and the quality of reported earnings because they are 
not subject to potential conflicts of interest that reduce their monitoring capacity. 
The audit committee should be made up of independent directors with experience 
and the ethical repute of taking the correct decisions in the firm’s interest, along 
with other members. Research conducted by Conyon (1994) indicates that 90% of 
large UK quoted firms had audit committees in 1993. Supporting Conyon’s (1994) 
research, Collier (1993) analyses audit committee adoption for 142 UK firms and 
argues that the adoption of audit committees among companies is in response to 
their agency cost of equity, debt and for information asymmetry. 
Empirically, the evidence regarding the relationship between audit committee and 
firm financial performance shows mixed results (see, for example, Carcello et al. 
2002; Carcello and Neal, 2003; Felo et al. 2003; Van der Zahn and Tower, 2004; 
Choi et al. 2004; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Defond et al. 2005; Chan and Li, 
2008; Davidson et al. 2005; Bedard et al. 2004; Chtourou et al. 2001; Klein, 1998; 
Bradbury et al. 2006; Yermack, 1996; Abdul Rahman and Ali 2006; Klein, 1998; 




Furthermore, Carcello et al. (2002) examine board characteristics and audit fees; 
their findings indicate that board independence and audit fees are positively corre-
lated. They argue that the independent audit committee demands higher audit qual-
ity beyond normal standards, hence, external auditors charging higher fees. In sim-
ilar studies, Carcello and Neal (2003) and Felo et al. (2003) document a positive 
relation between audit committee independence and financial reporting quality. 
Van der Zahn and Tower (2004) conducted research on the relationship between 
audit committees and earnings’ management using a sample of 485 firms from 
Singapore between 2000 and 2001. Their findings indicate that audit committee 
members who are more independent are also more effective, diligent and inde-
pendent in producing earnings management. Choi et al. (2004) find that larger au-
dit committees are effective and include members with varied professional exper-
tise to monitor financial reporting practices. Research by Karamanou and Vefeas 
(2005) finds that, in firms with effective board and audit committee structures, 
managers are likely to make good earnings’ forecasts and their forecasts are likely 
to be precise and accurate and eventually become more favourable to market re-
sponse. This empirical research shows that a good audit committee is linked to 
higher-quality financial disclosure for the firm.  
Another piece of research on audit committees having a positive impact on firm 
performance was carried out by Defond et al. (2005), which states that the an-
nouncement effect of 850 newly appointed outside directors to audit committees 
between 1993 and 2002 shows a positive significant abnormal return to the firms. 
Chan and Li’s (2008) research findings indicate that audit committees that are in-
dependent result in positive firm value. This means that the independent member 
is not under any influence. Their research also shows that all three of the commit-
tees – audit, nominating and compensation – will have a positive impact on the 
firm since their members’ knowledge and experience can be shared during board 
meetings.  
The establishment of audit committees can also have a negative impact on firm 
performance. This has empirically been researched by Davidson et al. (2005), who 
studied a sample of 434 listed Australian firms during the 2000 financial year; their 
findings indicate that non-executive directors on the audit committee board are 
found to be significantly associated with lower earnings’ management for the firm. 
Bedard et al. (2004) find that audit committee independence is negatively associ-
ated with the likelihood of aggressive earnings’ management. Research by 
Chtourou et al. (2001) and Klein (1998) find that independent directors on the audit 
committee are negatively associated with earnings’ management. Also, Bradbury 
et al. (2006) researched board size and audit committee size in firms in Singapore 
and Malaysia, showing significant correlation with Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
firm’s value. This result is consistent with the findings of Yermack’s (1996) re-
search where a sample of 452 large US industrial corporations between 1984 and 
1991 shows that a small board of directors is more effective. It appears that a large 
audit committee size and large board size may not be good for the company; in-





Another piece of research on audit committees shows no significant relationship 
with firm performance. For example, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) find no sig-
nificant relationship between audit committee independence and earnings’ man-
agement in Malaysian firms. Klein (1998) finds no evidence of a significant asso-
ciation between an audit committee which is independent and earnings’ manage-
ment. In another study, Zha (2006) uses a sample of firms from 2002 to 2004 im-
mediately after the release of the code of conduct by the Chinese Securities Regu-
latory Commission (CSRC), showing that the presence of audit committees has a 
positive impact on increasing earnings’ quality while audit committee independ-
ence has no significant impact.  
5.3.2 The Remuneration Committee 
Remuneration of directors has been a subject of discussion and debate as part of 
an effort to establish good corporate governance among owners of capital. Mallin 
(2006) describes the remuneration committee as a ‘hot’ issue which attracts a lot 
of attention from investors and the general public. The board of directors plays an 
important role in safeguarding shareholder interests by designing executive com-
pensation contracts to monitor CEOs and executive directors’ behaviour (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). Management compensation is seen as salary, bonus, perfor-
mance-based remuneration in shares, share options, superannuation payment, 
commission, company car, private health insurance or participating in profit shar-
ing with shareholders, large pension contributions and other miscellaneous earn-
ings from the company. These benefits are also known as ‘fat cat payment’ (Co-
nyon et al., 1995; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Gregg et al. 1993; Main and 
Johnston, 1993). The salary and other fringe benefits are determined by the remu-
neration committee and are based on a director’s qualifications, experience, past 
success and firm size (Herdan et al. 2011; Conyon and Peck, 1998). The directors 
and CEOs expect salary increases on a yearly basis. For example, a newly elected 
CEO or director will expect a higher salary and other benefits than the current CEO 
(Herdan et al. 2011).  
The principle concerning CEO or directors’ pay is that no one should take part in 
determining his or her own pay (Conyon and Peck, 1998). The Cadbury Report 
(1992) states that boards should appoint remuneration committees, consisting 
mainly of Non-Executive Director (NED), and chaired by a NED. The committee 
should propose to the board the remuneration of the executive directors taking into 
consideration outside advice. The executive directors should play no part in deci-
sions concerning their own remuneration (Cadbury Report, 1992).  
The Greenbury Committee (1995), which deals with management pay reform, rec-
ommended the adoption of remuneration committees consisting mainly of NEDs 
or outside directors. The Turner Review (2009) recommended that the remunera-





The Walker Review (2009) recommended that the chairperson should encourage 
contributions from the directors when it comes to decision on risk. The risk com-
mittee should also be separated from the audit committee for all FTSE 100-listed 
banks and insurance companies and that the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) should be 
appointed to the board of banks and other financial institutions (BOFIs), so that 
s/he can participate in risk management and oversight process at the highest level 
(Walker Review, 2009). 
The Financial Service Authority (FSA, 2012) amended the remuneration code re-
lating to banks, building societies and investment firms. The code was classified 
into three parts: that is, first, assessment of performance on an individual level; 
second, the nature of the business or unit concerned; third, the overall results or 
performance of the firm; the aim of the amendment is not to reward failure. 
According to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2014), executive directors’ 
remuneration should be designed to support any long-term success of the company. 
Performance of executives should be transparent in order not to attract any ambi-
guity. The remuneration committee should also reward NEDs based on the time 
and responsibilities they commit to the organisation. 
The Combined Code (2008) and OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004) recommended a long-term remuneration contract for directors since it will 
give the principal enough time to observe the long-term outcomes of any financial 
activities in the company (Melis et al. 2012). The committee should design an ef-
fective compensation contract so that executives or management will have an in-
centive to behave consistently with shareholders wishes (Daily et al. 1996; Conyon 
and Peck, 1998). Williamson (1985) argues that the absence of an independent 
remuneration committee is akin to an executive writing his or her employment 
contract with one hand and signing it with the other hand. According to William-
son, the establishment of a remuneration committee helps to exercise board control 
and design reward structures for management which are consistent with the interest 
of shareholders (Conyon et al. 1995; Ezzamel and Watson, 1997; Main and John-
ston, 1993). However, Abugu (2012) argues that the existing rules regarding mon-
itoring of directors’ remuneration packages are ineffective, as they do not address 
directors’ perks, expenses and other perquisites of office. According to him, the 
perks and other expenses claimed are more valuable to the director than the actual 
remuneration package and contribute to avenues for using company capital.  
The remuneration committee was established to reward incentives to agents in 
ways that benefit the principal (shareholder) and make directors accountable 
(Abugu, 2012). The interests of shareholders (principal) and executive directors 
(agents) should be aligned (Melis et al. 2012). Holmstrom (1979) states that the 
principal is always better off with more information about agent behaviour than 
when s/he has less information. Bolodeoku (2007) states that remuneration pack-
ages should be regulated in order not to create a burden to shareholders. However, 
according to Herdan et al. (2011), many agents (managers) work more efficiently 
when they receive strong motivation such as perks, bonuses, fringe benefits and 




Remuneration of directors and company performance has been an issue of concern 
in some Anglo-Saxon countries such as the UK and America, which focus more 
on the shareholder model (Solarz, 2006). For example, in the UK, investors and 
shareholders were shocked after the news about huge payments of £1.7 billion in 
bonuses to the managers of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), despite the bank 
making a £3.6 billion loss during the 2009 financial year. This shows that execu-
tives in companies award themselves compensation packages irrespective of the 
company performance (Solarz, 2006). The board members working on the remu-
neration committee at RBS should have stopped this bonus payment, considering 
the £3.6 billion losses from the bank after the financial crisis. Shlomo et al. (2013) 
state that high remuneration benefits can lead to excessive risk-taking and negative 
externalities, as employees will not take into account the potential negative effect 
of any decisions on their firms and society.  
Empirical evidence on remuneration committees shows mixed results. For exam-
ple, Main and Johnston’s (1993) evidence shows that management pay was signif-
icantly higher in companies that adopted remuneration committees. Murphy 
(1998) investigates the relative success between cash compensations, firm perfor-
mance and market-sector performance between 1970 and 1996. His research re-
veals no clear correlation between cash compensation and manager performance. 
However, remuneration of managers was correlated positively with firm perfor-
mance, but remuneration was negatively correlated with market-and-sector perfor-
mance. Gregg et al. (1993) examine 288 large UK firms from 1983 to 1991. Their 
evidence shows that directors’ pay relates strongly to firm size. They argue that a 
50% increase in a firm’s revenue results in a 10% increase in directors’ remunera-
tion. Also, during 1998, Conyon and Peck studied remuneration committees and 
the executive pay of 94 UK companies in the period 1991-1994. They report that 
the proportion of non-executive directors on a remuneration committee is posi-
tively related to senior management pay and also found that pay was sensitive to 
performance. They also state that compensation levels are greater in firms that 
adopt compensation committees. In response to the Conyon and Peck (1998) re-
search, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) studied 110 large firms from the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), which showed that CEO compensation is actually lower 
in firms where the CEO is a member of the compensation committee. This shows 
that compensation committees organised by directors seek the best interest of the 
shareholders (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). Also, Lewellen (2012) studied 50 US 
firms from 1942 to 1963 to ascertain the relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance. His research shows that generating profit strongly depends 
on CEO compensation.  
Research by Murphy (1998) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) states that the pay 
relating to performance is smaller in large firms and that the optimal pay perfor-
mance relation may decline with firm size for two reasons: that is, if shareholder 
wealth increases with firm size and the CEO’s direct effect on firm value may 
decrease with firm size. O’Reilly et al.’s (1988) research demonstrates that CEO 
compensation is greater when CEOs from different companies sit on a firm’s com-
pensation committee. Crespi and Gispert (1998) studied large Spanish companies 




Their research shows that remuneration has a stronger or positive impact on the 
firm book values than for stock market measures. 
Other empirical research on remuneration committees shows a negative impact on 
the firm. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2001) research shows that 
CEO compensation is less strong or weak when the company is better managed. 
This means that a well-managed company can handle its remuneration to the sat-
isfaction of both shareholders and executives. John and John (1993) studied top 
management compensation in firms and their results show a negative relationship 
between pay-performance and leverage. They concluded that managerial compen-
sation could play a role in minimising agency cost. Gregg et al. (2010) studied 
large UK firms and found that CEO pay has a negative or weak impact on firm 
performance. After their research, the data was split into two time periods; that is, 
1983-1988 and 1989-1991. They found that CEO pay is positively related to firm 
performance for the first time after the split. 
Finally, other empirical research on remuneration committees shows no significant 
impact on firms. For example, Daily et al. (1998) find no link between excessive 
pay received by CEOs and remuneration committees which are dominated by ex-
ecutive directors. Newman and Mozes (1999) supported this research when they 
analysed 161 firms from the US in 1992 and stated that there is no relationship 
between CEO pay and executive director participation in the remuneration com-
mittee. This means that executive directors do not necessarily influence CEO pay 
during remuneration meetings. 
5.3.3 The Nomination Committee 
The empirical research on nomination committees is still at its early stages. The 
role of the nomination committee is not as debatable as the remuneration and audit 
committees yet the nomination committee is responsible for the selection of the 
board members such as audit, remuneration, CEO and chairperson (Huse et al. 
2011; Ruigrok et al. 2006). The nomination committee helps determine the com-
pany’s leadership, which is very important for the survival of the company (Tarry 
2009; Vafeas, 1999). Eminet and Guedri (2010) state that the mission of the nom-
ination committee is to define the profiles of directors needed for the board and 
recommend future director candidates and in so doing reduce the influence of the 
CEO on the selection process. The role of the nomination committee is to appoint 
personnel to the board (Cadbury Report, 1992). In the past, nomination of person-
nel to the board was carried out through personal connections, making it difficult 
for the board to obtain people with the relevant skills and experience to help the 
company to develop (Combined Code, 2006).  
According to the Financial Reporting Council (2014), the nomination committee 
should ensure that the appointed board members have the appropriate balance of 
skills, age, gender, educational qualifications, experience, independence and 
knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their duties successfully. 




their skills and knowledge of the company. Byrne (1971) states that individuals 
with similar backgrounds may share similar life experiences and values and, for 
this reason, they may find interaction with each other easier than individuals with 
different experiences and values. The nomination committee should also plan for 
succession in case a board member leaves (Combined Code, 2006). To reduce 
agency conflict, the committee should improve board independence and the quality 
of appointed directors (Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Vefeas, 1999). 
The nomination committee should comprise independent non-executive directors 
and it should be chaired by the chairperson or an independent non-executive direc-
tor. The chairperson cannot chair the nomination committee when it is dealing with 
the appointment of a successor to his or her role. The nomination committee mem-
bers should not be re-elected for more than six years and consideration should be 
given to gender, diversity and the time commitment of board members to the board 
(FRC, 2014; Cadbury Report, 1992). Westphal and Milton (2000) state that a board 
committee member representing a minority on the board is likely to favour new 
board members who are similar to her or him. The size of the nomination commit-
tee ranges from three to five, depending on the size of the company (Tarry, 2009). 
In the past, the nomination committee was seen as serving as a rubber-stamping 
exercise where it would take recommendations both from the CEO and the Chair. 
Now, the nomination committee has brought a more rigorous and professional ap-
proach to the selection of board members. The committee is now engaged in as-
sessment of the company, executing strategy for the company and seeking external 
advice when the need arises (Tarry, 2009). Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) show 
that CEO involvement in board selection is associated with a lower proportion of 
outside director appointments. 
In making the nomination committee more effective, the Combined Code (2006) 
advocated a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors and stated that the committee should lead in the appointment of the board. 
Some nomination committees only meet when there is a vacancy to be filled during 
the year (Callahan et al. 2003). According to Conyon and Mallin (1997), firms in 
the UK have been very slow in adopting nominating committees, which shows a 
symptom of failure of the corporate governance system. McKnight and Weir’s 
(2009) research also states that nomination committee existence could be costly 
and yet there has been consistent recommendation of nomination committee adop-
tion in UK corporate governance regulation since 1992. The adoption of the nom-
ination committee will help the board to create a well-composed succession pro-
cess and an effective board. 
The empirical evidence on nomination committees is limited. Callahan et al. 
(2003) use principal component analysis (PCA) to ascertain management involve-
ment in directors’ nomination during a sample of 106 firms from 1989 to 1992 via 
a PCA method. Their result shows a positive relationship between management 
participation in the director selection process and corporate performance. Again, 
empirical evidence shows that nominating committee meetings are associated with 
poor performance, and the presence of the CEO and other directors’ involvement 




(Callahan et al., 2003). Zajac and Westphal (1996) state that the presence of inde-
pendent non-executive directors (NEDs) in the nomination committee and selec-
tion process will be positively associated with firm performance. Kaczmarek et al. 
(2012) use a panel of FTSE 350 companies from 1999 to 2008 to find the increas-
ing presence of female or non-British nationals on nomination committees. Their 
research shows a positive impact between board gender diversity and performance. 
They also reported that the presence of the CEO on the nomination committee 
shows a positive impact on the firm. 
Vefeas (1999) use a sample of 606 large US listed firms and find a positive rela-
tionship between the establishment of nomination committees and the quality of 
new director appointments. This means that the nomination committee can im-
prove board quality, which can in turn improve the effectiveness with which it 
carries out its monitoring and advisory roles. Vafeas and Theodorous (1998) use 
250 UK listed firms in 1994 to investigate the impact of audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees on the performance of these companies. They find no ev-
idence in favour of the idea that the existence of the three board committees sig-
nificantly affects financial performance. Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) argue that 
nomination committees help to achieve good governance in firms, since they ulti-
mately determine the quality of appointed directors. Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1997) state that CEO membership in nominating committees is associated with 
fewer independent directors on the board. This means that CEO involvement in 
the nomination committee will result in lower stock price reactions at the an-
nouncement of non-executive director appointments.  
The next section shows the function of the board and discusses the gender diversity 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3.4 Gender Diversity 
According to Van der Walt and Ingley (2003), gender diversity is a representation 
of different ages, genders, ethnicity, culture, religion, independence, knowledge, 
educational and professional background, skills, expertise and experience ap-
pointed into the boardroom to help in the decision-making process. For the purpose 
of this study, we define gender diversity as the case where the nomination com-
mittee includes both male and female members to serve on the board. This creates 
gender diversification and welcomes divergent views to the board. The nomination 
committee does not recruit solely because of gender but to offer a level-playing 
field to anyone who has the potential to help transform the firm positively48. Ac-
cording to Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, (2001) women can be perceived as peo-
ple who lack the requisite managerial skills and the same level of competency as 
men. They are also considered as ‘communal’ rather than possessing the ‘agentic’ 
qualities usually associated only with men. These qualities are viewed as being 
essential attributes of a good leader. A study by Hillman et al. (2002) argues that 
women have different backgrounds and characteristics that make them unique 
when compared with conventional directors. Women are known to ask tough ques-
tions and bring unity into leadership positions (Kramer at al. 2007).  
Generally, the debate on gender diversity involves two arguments (Carter et al. 
2010). The first argument holds the view that women with competent skills, expe-
rience and qualifications deserve the opportunity to serve on corporate boards. The 
second argument suggests that positive gender diversity amongst corporate direc-
tor’s results in better governance and enhances the performance of a firm. This 
second argument is that the representation of women on the board should serve 
solely to improve performance, otherwise firms will be engaging in ‘tokenism’.49 
If the nomination committee can show the importance of the presence of women 
on the corporate board, it will be easier for them to build a business case about 
their competency to the shareholders (Carter et al. 2010; Patterson, 1997). 
The appointment of women to the corporate board will enable them to share their 
knowledge and experience and increase divergent views and opinions within the 
corporate boardroom. All things being equal, people perceive things differently 
irrespective of their gender, and a combination of males and females participating 
in corporate boardroom discussions can help yield better results for the firm. This 
is supported by McLeod and Lobel (1992), who state that individuals with different 
opinions from diverse groups can improve the quality of decision-making and take 
into account the views of underrepresented groups. A study by Perryman et al. 
(2016) views that heterogeneity in decision-making by the corporate board helps 
to solve problems and enhances the presence of better decision-making because 
                                                 
48 Kreitz (2008) defines diversity as a significant difference that distinguishes one individual from another. 
49 Board gender diversity research has also been influenced by the term ‘tokenism’. This is the practice of 
representing a small group or minority in order to give an appearance of sexual or racial equality within a 
workforce (Kanter, 1977). Tokenism is described as a way in which a firm makes a perfunctory gesture of 
inclusiveness towards minority groups. Here, a person (woman) can meet a certain requirement but does 
not possess the auxiliary characteristics that are expected for a particular job or position such as sexual or 




the board can engage in the critical analysis of issues. A survey by Catalyst (2011) 
indicates that out of the Fortune 500 firms, between 2004 and 2008, the 148 finan-
cial institutions with women on the corporate board outperformed those without 
women board members. Rose (2007) argues that a high degree of board diversity 
in a company may serve as a positive signal to prospective job applicants looking 
to join that company.  
The balancing of the presence of males and females on any corporate board is not 
only a problem for firms but is also an issue for several countries as well50. For 
example, the European Commission (EC) is also considering imposing quotas of 
female representatives on corporate boards across the EU. Norway and Spain have 
legislation where there is a quota for women selected for membership on boards 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009); Malaysia has imposed a 30% quota and Brazil targets 
40% for state-controlled firms.51 There are also lobbying groups such as Women-
CorporateDirectors (WCD), who actively push for more women to be present in 
the boardroom52. Research by Rose (2007) reported a significant adoption of 
women onto the corporate boards of firms in Scandinavian countries53. Other coun-
tries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Belgium, Italy and the Nether-
lands have expressed a desire to follow the Scandinavian example of voluntarily 
appointing more women directors to the corporate board (Liu et al. 2014).  
  
                                                 
50 In December 2013 Twitter came under pressure from the media for neglecting to include women on their 
board. The CEO responded that the appointment of board members should not be a matter of just ‘checking 
a box’.  However, the company later appointed Marjorie Scardino as the first female director on the board. 
Twitter took a bold step in addressing this issue. http://www.wired.com/2013/12/twitter-board-bumbled-
gender-issues/. Accessed 10/02/2016. 
51 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/03/economist-explains-14. Accessed 06/02/16. 
52 http://www.womencorporatedirectors.com. Accessed 06/02/16. 


































6 SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 
ARTICLES 
6.1 Article 1: Audit Committee (AC) 
The first paper investigates the relationship between audit committee (AC) adop-
tion and the firm’s financial value in UK financial institutions. The paper also ex-
amines if the establishment of an audit committee impacted the value of UK finan-
cial institutions during the pre/post global financial crisis era. This is the first paper 
to provide such evidence and helps fill the gap in the current literature. 
The audit committee is responsible for monitoring the integrity of the firm’s finan-
cial statements; reviewing the firm’s internal financial controls and risk manage-
ment systems; acting as a bridge between the internal auditors; and monitoring the 
external auditor’s independence and objectivity. It also helps to implement policy 
on the engagement of the external auditor concerning the supplying of non-audit 
services, taking into consideration relevant ethical guidance regarding the provi-
sion of non-audit services by the external audit firm (Smith Review, 2003; FRC, 
2014 and 2016). 
The financial sector is a very challenging and complicated business nowadays and 
therefore its financial accounting reporting and disclosures have become demand-
ing. The establishment of audit committees by UK financial institutions can help 
monitor the integrity of the firms’ financial statements and review of all financial 
reporting. This paper uses secondary data from 63 financial institutions in the UK 
covering a 12-year period.  
Finally, the theoretical foundation surrounding the audit committee research is fo-
cused on agency theory. Agency theory is defined as “one in which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some ser-
vice on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to 
the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; p.308). The formation of an audit com-
mittee by the board of directors is designed to overcome agency problems and 
helps enhance the firm’s monitoring and effectiveness. However, a recent study by 
Khosa (2017) indicates that the presence of an audit committee can mitigate the 
agency costs between managers and shareholders. Also, the establishment of an 
audit committee helps to align the interests of management with those of the share-
holders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The establishment of an audit committee as 
part of best corporate governance practice helps to reduce agency costs and infor-
mation asymmetry by ensuring that a firm’s activities are conducted in line with 




Contribution of Audit Committee Article 
The empirical results indicate that audit committee (AC) adoption among UK fi-
nancial institutions has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the 
firm’s value as a measure of financial performance. The results during the pre-
crisis period also indicate that audit committee adoption made a positive and sig-
nificant contribution to the firm’s value. However, the adoption of an AC during 
the post-crisis period did not yield any impact on the firm’s value. Our results sug-
gest that, after the financial crisis (2009-2011), the entire UK economy was expe-
riencing an economic downturn and financial firms were no exception. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is among the first studies to 
examine empirically the role of AC adoption on UK financial institutions and such 
committees’ impact on firm value. Second, prior to the financial crisis in 
2007/2008 and afterwards, no single study has been conducted on the effects of 
AC adoption and its impact on either the pre- or the post-financial crisis periods. 
This is the first paper to provide such empirical evidence. This study fills any miss-
ing gaps in the audit committee (AC) and firm’s value relationship which exists in 
UK financial institutions (Mintah and Schadewitz, 2017). 
6.2 Article 2: Remuneration Committee (RC) 
The second paper still uses data from the 63 financial firms in the UK over a period 
of 12 years to address the presence of remuneration committees on UK financial 
performance. The purpose of this paper is first to address the question of whether 
the presence of remuneration committees can influence the corporate board in 
terms of financial performance. Second, what was the impact of the remuneration 
committee on UK financial firms during the pre/post global financial crisis peri-
ods? In answering these questions, the research makes an original contribution to 
the literature. 
The duties of the remuneration committee are to scrutinise the decisions of the 
board concerning: rewards, salary, bonus, share options and superannuation pay-
ments for executives (Conyon et al. 1995; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Gregg 
et al. 1993; Main & Johnston, 1993). Remuneration payments to executives are 
paid based on individual qualifications, experience, size of the firm and the success 
of the firm (Herdan et al. 2011; Conyon and Peck, 1998). The committee will help 
safeguard shareholders’ interests by designing remuneration contracts that monitor 
the behaviour of both the CEO and executive management (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Agency theory is used as the theoretical literature in supporting 




Contribution of Remuneration Committee Article 
The empirical results obtained indicate that the establishment of an RC has a pos-
itive and statistically significant effect on a firm’s market value (Tobin’s Q). Sub-
sequent tests conducted show that the presence of an RC had a positive and statis-
tically significant relationship on the firm’s ROA during the pre/post global finan-
cial crisis. The firm’s market value (Tobin’s Q) measured during the pre-crisis 
indicates a positive and statistically significant impact on the firm. The firm’s mar-
ket value did not show any significant relationship to RC during the post-crisis 
period. The reason is that the use of different dependent variables (ROA and Mar-
ket Value) produced different empirical results. These results are so important be-
cause, up to this point, no empirical research has been undertaken in UK financial 
institutions concerning the presence of the remuneration committee and how it im-
pacts a firm’s Market Value (MV) and ROA (Mintah, 2016). 
6.3 Article 3: Nomination Committee (NC) 
The third paper discusses the nomination committee, which is responsible for en-
suring that the right personnel, skills, talent and experience have been selected and 
appointed to help take the right strategic decisions for the firm (Financial Report-
ing Council 2012; 2014 and 2016). The selection of qualified personnel should 
include women who have the impetus for organisational success. When the nomi-
nation committee selects the right profile, it can heighten the probability of success 
for the firm. Due to the limited empirical research on the presence of the nomina-
tion committee and its impact on firm financial performance, this research is the 
first to empirically assess this aspect of UK financial institutions. This study helps 
to strengthen the debate on the association between the nomination committee and 
firm financial performance in the UK. 
The theoretical argument used to support this empirical research is drawn from 
studies conducted by Ruigrok et al. (2006) where agency, resource dependence 
and group effectiveness theories were used to support their work. 
First, agency theory primarily focuses on the separation of ownership and control 
that exist in organisations and the relationship between the principal and the agent 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The nomination committee, 
which is part of the board, ensures that the right executives and board members are 
appointed to control and reduce agency problems between the principal (owners) 
and agent (executive management). 
Second, resource dependence theory suggests that the role of the nomination com-
mittee will ensure that the firm uses its available resources such as background and 
skills, experiences and talents for the benefit of shareholders. The nominating com-
mittee (NC) should be able to appoint board members and executives who will 
consider the external environment, such as competitors, and external opportunities 




Third, group effectiveness and diversity theories suggest that people with common 
interests interact and work well together. The theory implies that people with com-
plementary backgrounds such as education, skills and talent commit themselves to 
a common goal for the firm (Ruigrok et al. 2006). The group could be made up of 
different gender, culture, ethnicity and geographical diversity working together to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth (ibid). This means that all members of the group 
are mutually accountable to each other. When the group members are accountable 
to each other, it brings collaboration and efficiency to the organisation. The role of 
the nomination committee is to consider appropriate skills, talent and educational 
background when making board appointments. Gender diversity should also be 
taken into consideration when recruiting for the firm. The NC will ensure that any 
person recruited to the board would both complement and collaborate with other 
members of the group in order to achieve the long-term objectives of the firm 
(Ruigrok et al. 2006). 
The three theories used in this study complement each other and support the exist-
ence of the nomination committee within UK financial institutions. 
Contribution of Nomination Committee Article 
The results from this study indicate a positive and statistically significant associa-
tion between the nomination committee and the firm’s market value (Tobin’s Q). 
Prior empirical studies by Callahan et al. (2003) confirm that the presence of a 
nomination committee results in a positive relationship with the firm’s corporate 
performance. Other empirical studies carried out during the crisis era indicate a 
positive and statistically significant impact on firms’ ROA during the pre/post fi-
nancial crisis period. The empirical evidence gleaned highlights that the adoption 
of a nomination committee has a significant impact on a firm’s financial perfor-
mance (Mintah, 2015). 
6.4 Article 4: Board Gender Diversity (BGD) 
The final paper, which originated from the establishment of nomination commit-
tees, discusses board gender diversity, especially the role of women within the 
corporate board. Board diversity is a case where there is a fair representation of 
males and females on any corporate board, with the aim of balancing divergent 
views and improving financial performance. Board gender diversity (BGD) has 
become an issue for discussion because of four benefits that a firm tends to gain 
when having a more gender diverse board, which are: improving financial perfor-
mance; opportunities to attract a wider pool of talent; becoming more responsive 
to the market; and, finally, the ability to strengthen its corporate governance poli-
cies (Doldor et al. 2012). 
The Financial Reporting Council in the UK (FRC 2014) requires firms listed on 




will help strengthen the firms’ corporate governance policies on gender diversity. 
In spite of several research projects on board gender diversity (BGD), this research 
is unique when compared to other previous empirical works because, primarily, it 
is the first time that such research has empirically ascertained board gender diver-
sity and firm value in UK financial institutions and, in particular, during the 
pre/post financial crisis era.  
Research on board gender diversity (BGD) has a mixed theoretical proposition. 
This means that there is no single theory predicting the relationship between 
women on the corporate board and firm financial performance (Carter et al. 2010). 
The first and most dominant theory used in supporting BGD research is agency 
theory. 
Agency theory deals with the separation of ownership from control, and the rela-
tionship that exists between the principal/owner and the manager/agent (Berle and 
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Boards with diverse backgrounds 
(male and female) perform strategic functions such as monitoring and advising, 
and bringing diversity into the decision-making process in boardrooms, which 
eventually increase firm performance (Johnston and Malina, 2008).  
The second theory deals with the stakeholder model, which states that a firm 
should maximise the welfare of a number of its stakeholders instead of only its 
shareholders (Blair, 1995). As stakeholders might have different expectations to 
those perceived by shareholders, the boardroom composition should be adjusted 
to reflect the expectations of all stakeholders, such as through the appointment of 
female directors (Low et al. 2015). For example, customers and the government 
may use their shareholding rights to push for diverse boards because of the need 
for social integration (Ntim, 2013). 
Third, resource dependence theory suggests that firms exist so that they can criti-
cally use the resources available to maximise their financial performance (Pfeffer, 
1978). Our empirical evidence provides positive support for this theory which sug-
gests that gender diversity improves decision-making and helps align the organi-
sation with its external environment and resources, thereby enhancing the firm’s 
financial performance (Carter et al. 2003). Board gender diversity results are con-
sistent with agency theory, stakeholder model and resource dependence theory pre-
dictions. 
Contribution of Board Gender Diversity Article 
This paper has contributed to the corporate governance literature by offering new 
insights on the board diversity and firm’s value relationship. The outcome of this 
empirical research shows that the presence of females on the corporate boards of 
UK financial institutions has a positive and statistically significant relationship to 
the firm’s value. Before the financial crisis era, that is, during the pre-crisis situa-
tion (2000-2006), our evidence reveals that the presence of females on the corpo-




value. This means that women contributed significantly to the firm’s value. How-
ever, after the financial crisis period, the presence of females on the board did not 
have any significant effect on the firm’s value. A reasonable explanation may be 
that, even though the financial crisis was over from 2009 to 2011, the entire UK 
economy was still experiencing an economic downturn and financial firms were 
no exception, irrespective of whether there was female representation on any cor-
porate board. Furthermore, the harsh macro-economic conditions after the crisis 
overshadowed the importance of having women on the corporate board. This has 
nothing to do with their competence but is due to uncontrollable systemic factors 
which are beyond their control. Overall, the findings are consistent with prior stud-
ies (Mintah and Schadewitz, 2017). 
6.5 Conclusion from the Articles 
This thesis has empirically demonstrated the consistent recommendations of vari-
ous corporate governance reforms in the UK regarding the establishment of board 
committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination and the presence of 
women on the corporate board (see, for example, Cadbury Report, 1992; Green-
bury Report, 1995; Combined Code, 2008; Walker Review, 2009; FRC, 2012; and 
many others). 
Specifically, using a sample of 63 financial firms from 2000 to 2011 (a total of 756 
firm-year observations) and corporate governance data collected from annual re-
ports, the articles have mainly examined the relationship between board commit-
tees and firm financial performance in the UK financial institutions. The articles 
have explicitly shown how these committees and the presence of women on the 
board were able to impact the firms during the pre/post financial crisis period. The 
UK financial institutions were chosen for this research because the UK has the 
biggest earnings in terms of GNP and is the second biggest market after the US for 
financial services.  
Collectively, the empirical results ascertained indicate that the establishment of 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees and the presence of women on the 
UK corporate boards had a positive and statistically significant relationship to the 
firms’ financial performance. The result supports theoretical expectations: that bet-
ter-governed firms should be associated with higher financial returns than their 
poorly-governed counterparts. Even though the ‘Comply or Explain’ nature of cor-
porate governance in the UK offers an optional regulation to firms, the results ob-
tained show that the establishment of these committees does not only become a 
market solution to organisational problems but can also accelerate a firm’s finan-
cial performance (Ntim, 2009). 
This research constitutes one of the first studies to examine the role played by UK 
financial institutions and the presence of women on the board and how they influ-




study has filled a major gap in the corporate governance literature by empirically 
ascertaining this. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with agency, stakeholder, resource depend-
ence and group effectiveness and diversity theories which suggest that board 
committees and the presence of women in UK financial institutions enhance 
board monitoring and bring new experience and business knowledge to the 
decision-making process in the boardrooms, thereby improving the firm’s fi-
nancial performance. 
This new research is important for policy-makers, regulators and the government 
as it has shown that the establishment of board committees and the presence of 
women on the corporate board is not a sign of ‘tokenism’ or a symbolic gesture, 
but that women have the propensity to enhance firm financial performance.  
Despite the numerous benefits of this thesis, this research still has some limitations. 
The data used is from UK financial institutions; other sectors were excluded. The 
data covers 63 financial institutions’ annual reports extracted for 12 years, gener-
ating 756 firm-year observations. The sample size is not large enough to make a 
generalisation of the findings to all financial institutions. 
Future research could examine the impact of board committees on the financial 
performance of manufacturing firms or educational industry in the UK. New re-
search could also look at CEO compensation and how it impacted on the firms 
during the pre/post financial crisis era. Finally, other studies can also look at the 
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